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Article 
Limits on the Perfect Preventive State 
MICHAEL L. RICH 
Traditional methods of crime prevention—the punishment of the 
culpable and the preventive restraint of the dangerous—are slowly being 
supplemented and supplanted by technologies that seek to perfectly prevent 
crime.  For instance, the federal government is developing in-car 
technology that would prevent vehicle operation when a driver has a blood 
alcohol level in excess of the legal limit.  Less directly, the anti-
circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 
try to prevent copyright infringement by eliminating technologies that 
enable such infringement.  Such structural regulation of private conduct is 
not new, but few scholars have focused on its use to prevent crime, and 
fewer still have examined how structural methods to fight crime fit within 
legal theory.  This Article begins that discussion with three aims.  First, I 
argue that perfect prevention—the use of technology by the State to make 
criminal conduct practically impossible—is a novel approach to crime 
prevention that requires separate scrutiny from punishment and 
prevention.  Second, I identify concerns with the use of perfect prevention 
and propose limitations on the perfect preventive state that are responsive 
to those concerns.  Specifically, I address the impact of perfect prevention 
on individual autonomy, concerns raised by the blanket application of 
perfect prevention on all people, and the question of whether and when 
perfect prevention should be the preferred approach for preventing certain 
criminal conduct.  Third, I highlight areas for future discussion of perfect 
prevention by scholars. 
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Limits on the Perfect Preventive State 
MICHAEL L. RICH* 
“If one could wave a wand and make it impossible for people 
to kill each other, there might seem little reason to hesitate.”1 
“But we should not pretend that [overcriminalization] is the 
worst affliction that can ever befall a state; we could come to 
utilize modes of social control that would make the criminal 
law seem benign by comparison.”2 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A “gap”3 exists between punishment and prevention, the twin 
traditional approaches to addressing crime.4  Within that gap, crime 
appears inevitable.  The punitive state enforces criminal laws by levying 
punishment for their violation.5  The reach of punishment is limited by the 
requirements that the State punish only after a crime has been committed6 
and only in proportion to the seriousness of the offense.7  The preventive 
                                                                                                                          
* Associate Professor of Law, Elon University School of Law.  J.D., Stanford Law School; B.A., 
University of Delaware.  I am indebted to Jonathan Zittrain, Ed Cheng, Eric Goldman, Michael Cahill, 
Miriam Baer, Kim Buchanan, Gregory M. Gilchrist, Steven R. Morrison, Erin Sheley, and the attendees 
of the 2013 Internet Law Work-in-Progress Conferences for their feedback and comments, to Amy 
Minardo for her comments and tireless support, and to Morgan Canady and Lincoln Bennett for their 
research assistance. 
1 JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET: AND HOW TO STOP IT 110 (2008). 
2 Douglas Husak, The Criminal Law as Last Resort, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 207, 215 (2004). 
3 See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Beyond Crime and Commitment: Justifying Liberty Deprivations 
of the Dangerous and Responsible, 96 MINN. L. REV. 141, 142 (2011) (“This choice between crime and 
commitment leaves a gap.”); see also Stephen J. Morse, Preventive Confinement of Dangerous 
Offenders, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 56, 58 (2004) (illustrating the gap using an example).  
4 See LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY 
OF CRIMINAL LAW 4–5 (2009) (discussing the possible disconnect when using punishment as 
prevention); Morse, supra note 3, at 56–58 (explaining how the gap allows some dangerous offenders 
to remain free); Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as 
Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1429–31 (2001) (suggesting a shift from punishment to 
prevention and its impact on dangerous offenders); Carol S. Steiker, Foreword: The Limits of the 
Preventive State, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 771, 774, 776 (1998) (contrasting prevention and 
punishment and the problems related to that distinction). 
5 See Steiker, supra note 4, at 771–73 (highlighting constitutional implementations of punishment 
and explorations of its limitations). 
6 Morse, supra note 3, at 58. 
7 See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment’s protection 
against cruel and unusual punishment flows from the basic precept of justice that punishment for [a] 
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state, meanwhile, “attempt[s] to identify and neutralize dangerous 
individuals before they commit crimes by restricting their liberty in a 
variety of ways.”8  Only those dangerous individuals who are not 
responsible for their actions, like the mentally ill, or who otherwise cannot 
be deterred by the threat of punishment may be subject to preemptive 
liberty restrictions.9  Because of these limitations on punishment and 
prevention, responsible people who are committed to their criminal goals 
remain “free to pursue their projects until they actually offend, even if their 
future wrongdoing is quite certain.”10 
Understandably, this is an unsatisfactory state of affairs for those 
whose job it is to protect the public, and they have responded by expanding 
the scope of both the punitive and preventive states in the hope that the two 
might eventually overlap.  So lawmakers criminalize conduct thought to be 
predictive of later criminal behavior, like gang membership, loitering, or 
“material support” of possible terrorist organizations, in order to permit 
punishment of the dangerous before they can cause actual harm.11  They 
also make it easier to civilly commit people considered particularly 
                                                                                                                          
crime should be graduated and proportioned to the offense.” (alterations in original) (quoting Weems v. 
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910))). 
8 Steiker, supra note 4, at 774. 
9 See David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War, 97 
CALIF. L. REV. 693, 697 (2009) (identifying that “civil commitment of mentally disabled persons who 
pose a danger to the community but lack the requisite intent to conform their conduct to the law is 
justified”); Morse, supra note 3, at 58 (stating that “pre-emptive precautions” are taken, “including 
broad preventive detention, with non-responsible agents based on an estimate of risk they present” and 
“the medical/psychological systems of behavior control” justify “extraordinary liberty infringements”); 
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Two Systems of Social Protection: Comments on the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 
with Particular Reference to Sexually Violent Predator Laws, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 69, 70 
(1996) (stating that “states have statutes permitting the indefinite civil commitment of persons who are 
mentally ill and dangerous”). 
10 Morse, supra note 3, at 58; see also Ferzan, supra note 3, at 142 (indicating that there is “no 
justification for substantial intervention against responsible agents prior to when they have committed a 
criminal offense”).  Of course, some crime also occurs because the punitive and preventive states are 
not perfect.  Criminals evade punishment for crimes they commit for a variety of reasons, including 
mistakes made by police or prosecutors, wrong decisions reached by juries, and evidentiary issues that 
make conviction impossible.  These criminals remain free and can commit more crime.  Such 
imperfections also diminish the deterrence value of punishment, as potential criminals hold out hope 
that they might be able to “get away with it.”  The preventive state also inevitably fails as  
dangerousness is difficult to predict.  See Christopher Slobogin, The Civilization of the Criminal Law, 
58 VAND. L. REV. 121, 145 (2005) (noting that even with improvements in risk assessment, recidivism 
predictions still cannot “prove future crimes . . . by clear and convincing evidence”). 
11 See Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the Demands of 
Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 2, 11 (2005) (defining “material support” to include lethal items, 
“provision[s] of safe houses, transportation, communication, funds, false identification, and training,” 
and indicating that “the material support charge functions as a basis for preventive charging against a 
potential sleeper”); Robinson, supra note 4, at 1430 (“Gang membership and recruitment are now 
punished.”); Steiker, supra note 4, at 774–75 (indicating that some localities provide “police broader 
preventive authority by enacting new substantive offenses such as ‘drug loitering’ or ‘gang loitering’”). 
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dangerous, such as sex offenders or suspected terrorists.12  Meanwhile, 
prosecutors push to expand the reach of existing inchoate crimes to allow 
police to intervene earlier in potentially dangerous activities.13  Scholars 
too are concerned with the gap between punishment and prevention and 
have proposed to bridge it in a variety of ways, while still utilizing the 
tools of prevention and punishment.14 
Yet some technological tools are already available that can 
supplement, and even supplant, punishment and prevention by rendering 
criminal conduct practically impossible, and more are on the horizon.15  
These tools, of what I call herein the “perfect preventive state,”16 enable 
the State to target social problems caused by crime that punishment and 
prevention have proven unable to reach.  They do not depend on the 
“deterrability” of potential criminals; rather, they seek to frustrate any 
                                                                                                                          
12 See ERIC S. JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT: AMERICA’S SEXUAL PREDATOR LAWS AND THE RISE 
OF THE PREVENTIVE STATE 3 (2006) (noting that “[predator] laws impose a restraint on sex offenders 
before a new crime is committed” by using civil commitment); Morse, supra note 3, at 61, 65 (stating 
that “the Supreme Court [recently] upheld the constitutionality of a new form of indefinite involuntary 
civil commitment that applies to . . . mentally abnormal sexually violent predators” and that mental 
health professionals may easily “[adjust] their expert testimony to support the conclusion that virtually 
any sexually violent predator meets the lack of control standard”); Alec D. Walen, Crossing a Moral 
Line: Long-Term Preventive Detention in the War on Terror, 28 PHIL. & PUB. POL’Y Q. 15, 15–18 
(2008) (indicating that “sexual predators [may] be detained even after they have served their sentences 
if the case is made that they lack the normal ability to control their impulses” and that suspected 
terrorists may be held in a “long-term preventative detention” even though the detainee has not been 
convicted of a crime). 
13 See Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory Prosecution and the Challenge of 
Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 425, 456–59 (2007) (discussing the use of conspiracy 
charges in preventive prosecution of suspected terrorists). 
14 See, e.g., Ferzan, supra note 3, at 167–69 (arguing that responsible individuals may be subject 
to preventive liberty deprivations if they have the intent to cause or risk causing harm and engage in 
some act in furtherance of that intent); Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 
NW. U. L. REV. 1, 42 (arguing that preventive detention should be permitted if an individual “wants to 
commit serious crime so badly that he is willing to be deprived of liberty or suffer similarly serious 
consequences for it”). 
15 Cf. ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 4, at 4 (recognizing that potential victims often seek to 
prevent crime by making it impossible); Stephen J. Morse, Protecting Liberty and Autonomy: 
Desert/Disease Jurisprudence, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1077, 1125 (2011) (“The best hope for the future 
is that we discover preventive, nonintrusive techniques that will lower the risk of violent offenses for 
everyone . . . .”). 
16 My use of the terms “perfect prevention” and “perfect preventive state” is inspired by Jonathan 
Zittrain’s discussion of using tethered appliances to accomplish “perfect enforcement” of the law, see 
ZITTRAIN, supra note 1, at 107–10, and Carol Steiker’s demarcation of the punitive and preventive 
states, see Steiker, supra note 4, at 773–74.  Like Zittrain, I use the adjective “perfect” to describe the 
goal of the technology in question rather than its ultimate effectiveness in accomplishing that goal.  See 
infra notes 80–85 and accompanying text.  Perfect prevention is a form of what Zittrain calls 
“preemption,” which involves “designing against undesirable conduct before it happens.”  ZITTRAIN, 
supra note 1, at 108.  And like Steiker, my use of the word “state” refers not to one of the fifty states in 
our federal system, but more generally to any sovereign governmental power.  Steiker, supra note 4, at 
773 n.19. 
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attempt to engage in the prohibited conduct.17  They do not require the 
State to make the empirically challenging determination of who is 
dangerous and irresponsible and therefore subject to special liberty 
deprivation;18 instead, they target criminal conduct and aim to prevent 
anyone from engaging in it. 
Take the “epidemic” of gun violence, for example.19  More than 10,000 
people are victims of homicides committed with a firearm each year, and 
despite the efforts of law enforcement and legislatures, the rate of gun 
fatalities has remained essentially constant over the last decade.20  
Moreover, over four times that number suffer non-fatal injuries each year 
as a result of intentional assaults with a firearm.21 
This violence persists despite traditional efforts at deterrence through 
punishment.22  Criminals who use or possess firearms face substantial 
sentencing enhancements.23  Those who traffic in drugs or commit crimes 
of violence and use, brandish, or discharge a firearm face onerous 
mandatory minimum sentences.24  Even mere possession of a firearm by a 
felon is a felony.25  Yet enhanced punishments are at best of marginal 
                                                                                                                          
17 See ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 4, at 4 (discussing strategies designed to increase the 
difficulty of causing harm as a way to prevent harm).  
18 See Laura I. Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands: Pretrial Detention, Punishment, & the 
Sixth Amendment, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1297, 1337–38 (2012) (discussing the unreliability of the 
predictions of future dangerousness and violence). 
19 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 940 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  I use “gun violence” 
here to mean the intentional use of a firearm to harm another person.  Thus, the phrase excludes suicide 
and accidental shootings, which caused nearly two-thirds of firearm fatalities in 2010.  WISQARS Fatal 
Injury Reports, National and Regional, 1999–2010, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/mortrate10_us.html (last updated Feb. 19, 2013) (select All 
Intents; then select Firearm; then select 2010 to 2010; then submit request; then repeat previous steps 
after first selecting Homicide and Legal Intervention; compare results).  For the reasons explained 
below, however, this Article focuses only on criminal conduct.  See infra notes 75–77 and 
accompanying text. 
20 WISQARS Fatal Injury Reports, National and Regional, 1999–2010, supra note 19 (select 
Homicide and Legal Intervention; then select Firearm; then select 1999 to 1999; then submit request; 
then repeat for every year from 1999 to 2010). 
21 WISQARS Nonfatal Injury Reports, 2001–2012, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/nfirates2001.html (last updated Mar. 28, 2013) (select Violence-
Related; then select Firearm; then select 2001 to 2001; then submit request; then repeat for every year 
from 2001 to 2011). 
22 See Sara Sun Beale, The Unintended Consequences of Enhancing Gun Penalties: Shooting 
Down the Commerce Clause and Arming Federal Prosecutors, 51 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1641 (2002) 
(stating that Congress has repeatedly raised the penalties for illegal gun possession). 
23 See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B3.1(b)(2) (2013) (increasing the base 
offense level for robbery where a firearm was used); see also DAVID M. KENNEDY, DETERRENCE AND 
CRIME PREVENTION: RECONSIDERING THE PROSPECT OF SANCTION 10, 13 (2009) (discussing state 
laws enhancing punishment for felony offenses committed while using or brandishing a firearm). 
24 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2012); see also Beale, supra note 22, at 1670 (calling § 924(c) “a 
kind of super-enhancement statute”). 
25 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). 
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benefit in deterring gun use,26 a fact confirmed by the sizable number of 
criminals who continue to possess or use guns in the course of their 
criminal activity.27 
Similarly, preventive efforts that preemptively restrict the liberty of 
dangerous, irresponsible individuals have not reduced gun violence to an 
acceptable level.  All jurisdictions provide mechanisms by which the State 
can preventively detain mentally ill people who present a danger to 
themselves or others before they can cause harm.28  Federal law prohibits 
people who have been “‘adjudicated as mentally defective’ or previously 
‘committed to a mental institution’” from purchasing a firearm.29  Such 
individuals continue to commit gun violence, however.30  And though the 
ineffectiveness of efforts to keep guns out of the hands of the dangerous 
mentally ill may be due in part to inadequacies in their implementation,31 
such measures would do little to stem the violence because the mentally ill 
are responsible for only a small percentage of the violent crime in the 
United States.32 
Perfect prevention may succeed, however, where the punitive and 
preventive states have failed by aiming to prevent the criminal conduct 
underlying the violence.33  For instance, many perpetrators of gun violence 
use guns that they do not legally possess.34  Some are stolen,35 while others 
are obtained through “straw man” purchases where a person legally 
                                                                                                                          
26 See Paul J. Hofer, Federal Sentencing for Violent and Drug Trafficking Crimes Involving 
Firearms: Recent Changes and Prospects for Improvement, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 41, 43–45 (2000) 
(providing examples of how mandatory firearm sentence enhancements have little or no impact on 
decreasing gun violence); Andrew V. Papachristos, Tracey L. Meares & Jeffrey Fagan, Attention 
Felons: Evaluating Project Safe Neighborhoods in Chicago, 4 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 223, 227–28, 260 
(2007) (analyzing the efficacy of gun violence deterrence programs).  
27 See CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FIREARM USE BY OFFENDERS 
1 (2002) [hereinafter FIREARM USE BY OFFENDERS] (reporting that approximately one-third of violent 
offenders carried or used a firearm). 
28 Dora W. Klein, When Coercion Lacks Care: Competency to Make Medical Treatment 
Decisions and Parens Patriae Civil Commitments, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 561, 561 (2012). 
29 James B. Jacobs & Jennifer Jones, Keeping Firearms Out of the Hands of the Dangerously 
Mentally Ill, 47 CRIM. L. BULL. 388, 390 (2011) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (2006 & Supp. II)). 
30 See id. at 400–01, 405–07 (describing the mental health history of perpetrators of large-scale 
killings with firearms). 
31 See id. at 395–98 (arguing that the national database of those who are disqualified from buying 
firearms due to mental illness is inadequate). 
32 Richard A. Friedman, In Gun Debate, a Misguided Focus on Mental Illness, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
17, 2012, at D5. 
33 Of course, one can also imagine fantastic technologies that would make gun violence 
impossible, like smart bullets that break apart harmlessly before hitting a person.  I will attempt, 
however, to limit my discussion herein to technologies that are at least plausible. 
34 See NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE: A CRITICAL REVIEW 76 (Charles F. 
Wellford et al. eds., 2005) (suggesting that research demonstrates that offenders “buy, borrow, sell, and 
otherwise exchange guns quite frequently”). 
35 Id. at 78. 
 890 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:883 
permitted to buy a firearm does so and passes it on to a person, such as a 
felon, not lawfully entitled to own the weapon.36  The implementation of 
so-called “smart gun” technologies, which make a gun capable of being 
fired only by its lawful owner, could make it so that many violent criminals 
would be unable to obtain a usable firearm.37  Similarly, technology exists 
that could disable guns in public places where gun possession is illegal, 
like schools, universities, and commercial establishments.38  If properly 
implemented, this technology could prevent gun violence in those 
locations, again by targeting underlying criminal conduct. 
This is not to say that this technology could solve the gun violence 
problem on its own.  Only gun violence committed in certain places or 
with illegally-obtained weapons would be curtailed.  Additional legislative 
steps, including closing loopholes in the licensing and sale process, would 
still be needed.39  Older weapons lacking these technologies would need to 
be removed from circulation or updated.40  And opponents of gun control 
would certainly oppose the implementation of these new technologies.41  
But the point remains that perfect prevention—technology aimed at 
making criminal conduct practically impossible—could reduce instances of 
gun violence that have resisted traditional prevention strategies.42 
Some perfect prevention regimes are already in place.  For example, 
the anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
                                                                                                                          
36 Id. 
37 See Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 
549, 595–96 (2009) (describing the shift in political arguments around gun control); Nick Bilton, Smart 
Guns Can’t Kill in the Wrong Hands, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2013, at B6 (discussing biometric and grip 
detection technologies).  Though such placement is not typically an indication of feasibility, a version 
of this technology was featured in the most recent James Bond film, Skyfall.  Joe Pappalardo, Fact vs. 
Fiction: The Truth About Skyfall’s Weapons, POPULAR MECHANICS (Nov. 7, 2012), 
http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/digital/fact-vs-fiction/fact-vs-fiction-the-truth-about-
skyfalls-weapons-14544466. 
38 See Bilton, supra note 37 (discussing technologies that limit gun violence). 
39 See David Kairys, Self-Defense and Gun Regulation for All, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1669, 1676–77 
(2013) (outlining the “gun-show loophole” that allows buyers who are not licensed dealers to legally 
resell a firearm without doing a background check). 
40 See Nicholas J. Johnson, Imagining Gun Control in America: Understanding the Remainder 
Problem, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 837, 884–85 (2008) (raising the issue of retrofitting older guns 
with new gun safety technology). 
41 See Bilton, supra note 37 (describing gun manufacturer opposition to safety technologies); 
Steve Friess, NRA: Smart Guns Are Plain Stupid, WIRED (Apr. 30, 2002), 
http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/2002/04/52178 (same).  
42 Efforts to reduce gun violence also face unique constitutional and political hurdles.  The 
Supreme Court invalidated a ban on handgun possession in the home, thereby recognizing an expanded 
individual Second Amendment right to possess a firearm.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 
594, 628–29, 635 (2008); see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) 
(holding that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is incorporated against the states by 
the Fourteenth Amendment).  More recently, the Seventh Circuit held that the Second Amendment 
prevented Illinois from banning the carrying of guns in public.  Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 940–
42 (7th Cir. 2012).  
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(DMCA) of 1998 make it illegal to develop technology that could be used 
to circumvent technological protections on copyrighted material.43  By 
causing such technologies to be unavailable, the DMCA aims to make 
many kinds of copyright infringement practically impossible for the 
average person.44  Other perfect prevention technologies are under 
development.45  The Driver Alcohol Detection System for Safety, for 
instance, is a joint project between the federal government and private 
industry that would place technology in new vehicles to prevent their 
operation when the driver is intoxicated.46 
Though its feasibility has increased as technology has advanced and 
become more central to criminal conduct, the idea of the State preventing 
criminal conduct by making it essentially impossible is not a novel 
concept.  For more than three decades, the Situational Crime Prevention 
(SCP) movement has advocated for crime prevention measures that make 
crime more costly to commit.47  More recently, Neal Kumar Katyal has 
discussed the use of architecture to prevent crime in spaces both real48 and 
digital,49 and Edward Cheng has argued that in some circumstances 
structure may be a better crime prevention tool than legislative fiat.50   
Technologists have joined the party, too.51  Joel Reidenberg recognized 
that the Internet created an opportunity for ex ante enforcement of legal 
rules.52  Lawrence Lessig’s famous claim that “[c]ode is law” 
                                                                                                                          
43 17 U.S.C. §1201(a)(2)(A) (2012). 
44 See Julie E. Cohen, Pervasively Distributed Copyright Enforcement, 95 GEO. L.J. 1, 9–11 
(2006) (analyzing cases involving technological infringement and the impact of those decisions on 
copyright law). 
45 See, e.g., Rutgers Engineers Design Cell Phone App to Reduce Distracted Driving, RUTGERS 
TODAY (July 29, 2012), http://news.rutgers.edu/medrel/research/rh-2012/rutgers-engineers-de-
20120726 (discussing smartphone apps that help to reduce driver distraction).  
46 See Michael L. Rich, Should We Make Crime Impossible?, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 795, 
828–29 (2013) (discussing in detail the Driver Alcohol Detection System for Safety). 
47 See Ronald V. Clarke, Situational Crime Prevention, 19 CRIME & JUST. 91, 110–11 (1995) 
(discussing “target hardening” and “access control” measures to prevent crime).  
48 Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1039, 1138–39 (2002).  
49 Neal Kumar Katyal, Digital Architecture as Crime Control, 112 YALE L.J. 2261, 2263–64 
(2003). 
50 Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 
655, 664–65 (2006). 
51 In addition to those discussed in the text, a number of other legal scholars have recognized the 
unique opportunities that technology presents to regulate private conduct.  See, e.g., JULIE COHEN, 
CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 218 
(2012) (“The geographies and architectures of networked space establish the material field for 
processes of self-constitution.”); R. Polk Wagner, On Software Regulation, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 457, 
493, 513 (2005) (“[T]he law-software equilibrium for a particular regulatory condition is generally 
determined by private decisionmaking related to the costs and benefits of each regulatory effect (law 
and software).”). 
52 Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through 
Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 581 (1998); see also Joel R. Reidenberg, Technology and Internet 
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acknowledged that the structure of the Internet can be used by powerful 
interests to prevent unsavory conduct.53  Jonathan Zittrain warned that the 
proliferation of “tethered appliances”—essentially computers connected to 
networks that control and limit their operation—opens the door to the 
“perfect enforcement” of legal rules.54  
These scholars have recognized the (relatively untapped) potential of 
technology to impose powerful, and sometimes unseen, restrictions on 
conduct.55  They have also delineated some potential practical and legal 
concerns with the implementation of such restrictions.56  But scholars thus 
far have failed to situate the emergence of perfect preventive technologies 
within relevant legal theories.57  Doing so is crucial.  The political pressure 
to prevent crime is enormous,58 and similar pressure can be expected in 
support of using technology to prevent criminal conduct.59  In the context 
of punishment and preventive detention, courts and scholars have 
discussed exhaustively, if not conclusively, the balancing of these concerns 
and the proper limitations on government authority that result.60  
Examining the emerging perfect preventive state in the light of this 
experience is necessary to identify limits on the use of perfect prevention 
                                                                                                                          
Jurisdiction, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1951, 1966 (2005) [hereinafter Reidenberg, Technology and Internet 
Jurisdiction] (further exploring the potential and limits of technological enforcement). 
53 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6 (1999) (emphasis omitted); see 
id. at 6–7 (demonstrating the significance of substantive value choices in constituting cyberspace). 
54 ZITTRAIN, supra note 1, at 104–10. 
55 See COHEN, supra note 51, at 156 (“Architectures of control are emerging gradually, in a 
piecemeal, uncoordinated fashion, at points where the interests of powerful institutional actors align.”). 
56 These concerns can be substantial and involve, inter alia, the monetary cost of such technology, 
fairness issues arising from the distribution of these costs, and procedural due process concerns.  See 
Rich, supra note 46, at 843 (engaging in an economic analysis of perfect preventive technology); see 
also Reidenberg, Technology and Internet Jurisdiction, supra note 52, at 1965 (noting that 
technological rule enforcement must comply with constitutional due process requirements). 
57 See infra Part III.C. 
58 See David Michael Jaros, Perfecting Criminal Markets, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1947, 1985–86 
(2012) (explaining that some scholars blame the “unremitting expansion” of criminal law on a 
“legislative process that exaggerates the temporary passions of the electorate”); Robinson, supra note 4, 
at 1433–34 (discussing current crime rates such as violent crime, aggravated assault, and juvenile crime 
to show that “political forces inevitably will press for protective measures if a perception of public 
vulnerability exists,” and noting that “it is understandable that today’s citizens are demanding greater 
protection and that legislators are seeking new ways to provide it”). 
59 See Jack M. Balkin, Room for Maneuver: Julie Cohen’s Theory of Freedom in the Information 
State, 6 JERUSALEM REV. L. STUD.  79, 94–95 (2012) (arguing that governments and businesses seek to 
use technology to preserve their own interests, like intellectual property rights and data collection, but 
these same governments and businesses want to keep “digital enforcement” moving toward “the 
construction of a great two way mirror in which ordinary people’s lives are increasingly transparent to 
powerful public and private entities that are not transparent to the people they view”). 
60 See Steiker, supra note 4, at 773–74, 776–77 (noting some of the limits placed on the punitive 
state, such as procedural protections in criminal proceedings, burden of proof requirements, and the 
Fourth Amendment in contrast to the yet-to-be-defined and not-fully-examined limits on the preventive 
state).  
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before it becomes institutionalized. 
This Article has three specific aims.  First, it argues that perfect 
prevention is a novel approach to crime prevention, different from 
punishment and prevention in important ways that impact the proper limits 
on its use.  Second, it identifies potential concerns with the use of perfect 
prevention and proposes limitations on the perfect preventive state that 
respond to those concerns.  Third, it identifies areas for future 
consideration of the perfect preventive state by scholars. 
Part II defines the perfect preventive state and makes some important 
observations about the implementation of perfect preventive technology.  
Part III briefly discusses the punitive and preventive states and their 
limitations, and explains why those limitations are inapplicable to the 
perfect preventive state.  This Part further compares the perfect preventive 
state to precursors, such as SCP, and explains how advocates of these 
precursors have failed to provide the theoretical foundation necessary to 
develop limits on perfect prevention.  Part IV identifies and assesses 
possible objections to perfect prevention and explores potential substantive 
limits to address those concerns.  Specifically, Part IV addresses the impact 
of perfect prevention on individual autonomy, concerns raised by the equal 
application of perfect prevention, and the question of whether and when 
perfect prevention should be the preferred approach to preventing certain 
criminal conduct.  Part V concludes by identifying issues relating to perfect 
prevention that remain for further exploration. 
II.  CONCEPTUALIZING THE PERFECT PREVENTIVE STATE 
This Part deals with two preliminary issues.  First, it defines perfect 
prevention.  Second, it makes further relevant observations about how 
perfect prevention works. 
A.  Defining Perfect Prevention 
Perfect prevention seeks to prevent all instances of certain targeted 
criminal conduct by rendering that conduct practically impossible.  This 
definition incorporates four requirements for a crime prevention tool to be 
part of the perfect preventive state.  The first is that it requires government 
action; conversely, it does not include private self-help.  A government 
directive that all homeowners put bars on ground-floor windows to prevent 
break-ins would be part of the perfect preventive state.  A private 
homeowner choosing to put bars on the ground-floor windows of her home 
to prevent burglaries would not.  Perfect prevention is limited to only 
government directives because the State’s involvement implicates 
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individual liberty interests where private action does not.61 
Note that actions by the State that fall short of directly mandating the 
implementation of preventive technology are still tools of perfect 
prevention.  For instance, unauthorized duplication of copyrighted 
materials is a crime,62 but the federal government does not require 
copyright owners to implement any specific technology to prevent such 
copying.63  Rather, the DMCA criminalizes the creation of means to 
circumvent whatever technological protection measures that copyright 
owners choose to implement.64  In doing so, the DMCA aims to make the 
tools of circumvention unavailable to the general public.65  Without those 
tools, the criminal conduct of unauthorized duplication becomes practically 
impossible for the average person.  Thus, the DMCA’s anti-circumvention 
provisions are part of the perfect preventive state even though they do not 
mandate the use of preventive technology.66  
The second notable characteristic of the perfect preventive state is that 
it targets criminal conduct instead of specific potential criminals.  Laws 
that require that all convicted drunk drivers install ignition interlocks that 
prevent operation of their automobiles absent a clean breath sample are not 
part of the perfect preventive state, because they target only the subset of 
                                                                                                                          
61 Freedom and liberty, after all, are defined in relation to government, rather than private, 
restraint.  See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (“Liberty protects the person from 
unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places. . . . Liberty presumes an 
autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.”); 
Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in LIBERTY: INCORPORATING FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 166, 
169–71, 178 (Henry Hardy ed., 2002) (defining negative and positive liberty in terms of the 
relationship between the individual and the government and the amount of interference from the 
government or outside forces).  Thus, while a private homeowner’s decision to place a high fence 
around her property to keep out burglars would not intrude on anyone’s liberty interest, a government 
mandate that all private property be surrounded by such a fence certainly would.  See Larry Alexander 
& Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Danger: The Ethics of Preemptive Action, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 637, 641 
(2012) (discussing the practice of protection as a “technique for dealing with dangerous persons,” 
explaining that fences are a form of protection because they are designed to make criminal conduct 
impossible or undesirable, and arguing that protection does not interfere with the liberty rights of others 
because the “would-be burglar has no right that our property not be surrounded by a high fence . . . . 
[and] no right that we make his planned violation of our rights easy or safe”). 
62 See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2012) (“Any person who willfully infringes a copyright shall be 
punished as provided under section 2319 of title 18.”).  For a history of the criminalization of copyright 
infringement, see Note, The Criminalization of Copyright Infringement in the Digital Era, 112 HARV. 
L. REV. 1705, 1706–12 (1999).  
63 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(3) (“Nothing in this section shall require that the design of, or design 
and selection of parts and components for, a consumer electronics, telecommunications, or a computing 
product provide for a response to any particular technological measure . . . .”). 
64 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A). 
65 Cohen, supra note 44, at 7. 
66 Polk Wagner describes the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions as an example of “legal 
preemption” by which the law addresses the regulatory effect of software.  Wagner, supra note 51, at 
485.  Wagner’s legal preemption and perfect prevention overlap where the law uses the regulatory 
power of code with the aim of making criminal conduct practically impossible. 
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the population deemed most likely to commit the offense of drunk 
driving.67  On the other hand, a law requiring all cars be manufactured with 
a similar ignition interlock system would be part of the perfect preventive 
state, because it would aim to prevent all instances of the targeted criminal 
conduct, regardless of the specific criminal proclivities of the actor. 
The third defining characteristic of the perfect preventive state is that it 
aims to eliminate the targeted criminal conduct by making the conduct 
practically impossible, rather than merely inadvisable.  The distinction 
here is both temporal and a matter of degree.  Thus, government efforts to 
detect crime after the fact, like cameras that photograph the license plates 
of vehicles that run a red light, are not part of the perfect preventive state.  
Instead, these efforts try to increase the efficacy of the punitive state by 
enhancing deterrence.68  The perfect preventive state may tackle the same 
problem through in-vehicle technology that detects a red light and 
automatically stops the vehicle before it enters the intersection.69  
However, the ex ante nature of a measure is not sufficient to situate it 
squarely in the perfect preventive state.  The measure must also seek to 
increase the difficulty of committing the crime so as to not only deter the 
potential criminal but to simply frustrate her.70  Take, for example, a statute 
requiring convenience stores to install drop safes that allow employees to 
deposit money but prevent them from taking it out in the event of a 
robbery.71  A drop safe increases the time and effort a would-be robber 
must expend to steal a substantial amount of money from the store, which 
in turn gives police more time to respond and increases the likelihood of 
apprehension.  From this perspective, the drop safe requirement is a tool of 
the punitive state, because it aims to deter crime by convincing potential 
                                                                                                                          
67 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-179.3(g5) (2012) (detailing how North Carolina’s “ignition 
interlock” law applies to individuals who have had their drivers licenses revoked for drunk driving). 
68 See Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy in Autonomous Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1171, 1208 
(2012) (“One purpose of overt surveillance is to affect the behavior of those being watched, to assure 
that individual behavior conforms to societal norms.”). 
69 See John Markoff & Somini Sengupta, Drivers with Hands Full Get a Backup: The Car, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 12, 2013, at A1 (explaining similar technology that automatically slows or stops the car 
when a pedestrian or cyclist is in the path, making it so drivers will no longer “have to worry about car 
crashes and collisions” because the movement of the car will be out of their control). 
70 See Cheng, supra note 50, at 664 (“Viewed from a would-be defendant’s perspective, there is a 
difference between being able to do something but knowing that you will likely get caught . . . and not 
being able to do it at all.”). 
71 See, e.g., HOUS., TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 28-408 (2013) (requiring convenience stores in 
Houston, Texas, to “have a drop safe on the premises to keep the amount of cash available to 
employees to a minimum”).  Edward Cheng uses the example of metal post boxes to illustrate a similar 
point.  See Cheng, supra note 50, at 664 (“[W]ith the mailbox, the fact that a would-be mail thief must 
now spend additional time picking the mailbox lock or carry conspicuous welding equipment to cut the 
steel makes the thief more vulnerable to detection.”).  I eschew this example because the governmental 
origins of the U.S. Postal Service raise the murky issue of whether the use of such mailboxes 
constitutes a government mandate or private self-help. 
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criminals that if they try to rob a convenience store they will either steal 
very little money or get caught.  But if the mandated drop safe is so secure 
that accessing its contents is practically impossible, then it becomes a tool 
of the perfect preventive state.  The point at which a measure stops being 
punishment and becomes perfect prevention is not amenable to clear 
definition.72  The critical point, though, is that there is a point at which a 
measure makes criminal conduct so costly and difficult to achieve that it no 
longer seeks to deter but instead aims to frustrate those who might engage 
in the conduct by making it practically impossible to do so.73 
The fourth and final defining characteristic of the perfect preventive 
state is that it targets criminal conduct for prevention.  The State of course 
could theoretically mandate the use of technology to prevent any harmful 
conduct, whether that conduct has been legislatively defined as criminal or 
not.74  But when the legislature defines conduct as criminal, it 
communicates moral condemnation of conduct that is so unacceptable and 
deleterious to society’s interests that the conduct is not just discouraged but 
forbidden.75  Civil sanctions, on the other hand, lack that moral element76 
and thus do not define forbidden conduct as much as they place a cost on 
conduct that society wishes to discourage.77  The State’s interest in 
preventing criminal conduct is therefore subject to the narrowest 
limitations.78  By the same token, the limitations on the State’s ability to 
prevent criminal conduct will apply with equal or greater force when the 
State seeks to prevent non-criminal conduct.79  Consequently, limiting our 
consideration to technologies that aim to prevent criminal conduct allows 
us to identify limitations that also apply to the State’s use of technology to 
                                                                                                                          
72 See Cheng, supra note 50, at 664 (acknowledging that the difference may smack of “splitting 
hairs”).  
73 Id. 
74 See ZITTRAIN, supra note 1, at 108 (recognizing that one could seek to “design[] against” any 
“undesirable conduct” and providing examples of technological preemption of conduct). 
75 See Erik Luna, Principled Enforcement of Penal Codes, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV 515, 538 (2000) 
(“Law, particularly criminal law, also serves an educational function—to express boundaries between 
the acceptable (but possibly distasteful) and the forbidden—illuminating the border and suggesting that 
the public steer clear.”); Paul H. Robinson, Rules of Conduct and Principles of Adjudication, 57 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 729, 731 (1990) (“The rules of conduct function [of the criminal law] gives the general 
population ex ante direction as to what they can, must, and must not do.”). 
76 See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 404 
(1958) (“What distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction . . . is the judgment of community 
condemnation which accompanies and justifies its imposition.”).  But see Carol S. Steiker, Punishment 
and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 782–
84 (1997) (discussing the breakdown in the distinction between criminal and civil regulations). 
77 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1105–06 (1972) (discussing how 
regulating entitlements helps society solve internal conflicts). 
78 See Reidenberg, Technology and Internet Jurisdiction, supra note 52, at 1965 (explaining the 
internal constitutional and public policy limits on the use of state power). 
79 See Hart, supra note 76, at 404 (explaining the difference between criminal and civil sanctions). 
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prevent non-criminal conduct. 
B.  One Disclaimer and Two Additional Observations 
Now that we have defined perfect prevention, one disclaimer and two 
interrelated, non-definitional observations are helpful to understand how 
perfect prevention works.  The disclaimer is that perfect prevention is not 
so named because it does, or even can, prevent all instances of the targeted 
criminal conduct.  Technology inevitably fails,80 and the resourcefulness of 
motivated criminals knows few limits.81  Instead, the “perfect” in perfect 
prevention comes from its goal of preventing all instances of that conduct.  
This quest for the elimination of all criminal conduct distinguishes the 
perfect preventive state from punishment and prevention.  The punitive 
state serves both utilitarian and retributive functions, and thus punishment 
is not calibrated to achieve perfect deterrence of all crime.82  Even if it 
were, some crimes and criminals cannot be deterred.83  Similarly, because 
prevention targets only those most likely to commit crime, it would not 
prevent all instances of criminal conduct even if it could flawlessly identify 
those people.84  Perfect prevention seeks to wipe out certain criminal 
conduct entirely, and even if it can never quite succeed, the sweeping aim 
has unique implications that demand exploration.85 
The first observation is that, like any structural regulation, the perfect 
preventive state can, but need not, operate non-transparently.  Physical 
architecture can regulate conduct non-transparently by simply removing 
choices, thus making it so that the targets of regulation do not even know 
that their choices have been constrained.86  Similarly, the “tethered 
appliances” discussed by Jonathan Zittrain often do not reveal the conduct 
                                                                                                                          
80 See Rich, supra note 46 (describing the inevitable errors in perfect preventive technology); 
Reidenberg, Technology and Internet Jurisdiction, supra note 52, at 1965 (noting that technological 
enforcement of laws is inevitably imperfect). 
81 See Cheng, supra note 50, at 691 (noting that if the State required speed governors on all new 
vehicles, the “governors could be disconnected or otherwise disabled”); Cohen, supra note 44, at 41 
(“Technically-skilled risk-takers will be able to hack the code, defeat the watchers, and nurture thriving 
darknets.”). 
82 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A.1.2 (2013) (delineating the purposes of 
sentencing as “deterrence, incapacitation, just punishment, and rehabilitation”). 
83 Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 
85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1243 (1985). 
84 See id. (explaining that because courts cannot obtain perfect information about individuals and 
their acts, “[t]he courts . . . cannot employ [appropriate] sanctions”). 
85 See COHEN, supra note 51, at 175 (recognizing that imperfect structural constraints can have an 
“effect on the everyday lives of network users”). 
86 See Lee Tien, Architectural Regulation and the Evolution of Social Norms, 7 YALE J.L. & 
TECH. 1, 7 (2004–2005) (“Architectural regulation . . . structures the conditions of action, e.g., social 
settings and/or the resources available in those settings.  It thus regulates the behavior that occurs in 
those settings or that utilizes those resources.”). 
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or action that they restrict.87  And even when regulation is evident, the 
parameters governing what conduct is permitted and what conduct is 
forbidden may not be.88  Finally, structural regulation can obscure who is 
responsible for the limitations on individual action.89 
Yet opacity is not a necessary feature of structural regulation generally, 
or perfect prevention specifically.90  The government can choose to reveal 
its role in regulating conduct and specify, or at least not obscure, the 
conduct it means to prevent, its reasons for doing so, and the means 
necessary to accomplish that goal.  The fact that perfect prevention can be 
transparent or obscure does not tell us whether transparency is good or bad 
or what kind of transparency should be preferred—there will be more on 
that later91—but the important point for now is that the transparency of 
perfect prevention is often a design decision. 
Second, the use of perfect prevention to frustrate criminal conduct is 
most plausible where the targeted criminal conduct is dependent upon or 
enabled by some technological intermediary.92  When criminal conduct 
depends on technology, the State can prevent the criminal conduct by 
either restricting the availability of the technology altogether or by 
mandating limitations on the capacity of the enabling technology to allow 
criminal conduct.93   
The Undetectable Firearms Act of 198894 is an example of the former 
approach,95 as it criminalizes the manufacture, importation, or possession 
                                                                                                                          
87 ZITTRAIN, supra note 1, at 107–09. 
88 See James Grimmelmann, Regulation by Software, 114 YALE L.J. 1719, 1736 (2005) 
(describing how physical architecture is “ambiguous”). 
89 See Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 
501, 541–43 (1999) (discussing secret government regulation and its potential role in society today); 
Tien, supra note 86, at 6–8 (providing examples of how many architectural regulations leave unknown 
the source of the regulation). 
90 See Katyal, supra note 49, at 2284–85 (noting that some forms of government regulation are 
more transparent than others). 
91 See infra Parts III.A, III.B. 
92 See LESSIG, supra note 53, at 49 (noting that in the context of copyright violations, “regulating 
users alone would be difficult but regulating the code that users use would not be as difficult”). 
93 See Wagner, supra note 51, at 485–86 (discussing other examples of this regulatory technique).  
When the government dictates that producers of technology put limitations on its use, these limitations 
legitimize Lawrence Lessig’s famous, and often criticized, aphorism, “Code is law.”  LESSIG, supra 
note 53, at 6; see also Grimmelmann, supra note 88, at 1721 (“[C]ode does the work of law, but does it 
in an architectural way.”); Greg Lastowka, Decoding Cyberproperty, 40 IND. L. REV. 23, 57 (2007) 
(“[C]ode is digital ‘architecture’ that does the work of law, but is not law, qua law.” (quoting 
Grimmelmann, supra note 88, at 1721)).  
94 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–22 (2012).  
95 The anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA, see supra notes 43–44 and accompanying 
text, and the Audio Home Recording Act, which required that digital audio recording devices 
“incorporate technological controls to block second-generation digital copies,” Peter S. Menell & 
David Nimmer, Legal Realism in Action: Indirect Copyright Liability’s Continuing Tort Framework 
and Sony’s De Facto Demise, 55 UCLA L. REV. 143, 163 (2007) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (2000)), 
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of a firearm that cannot be detected by a metal detector or x-ray machine.96  
That ban makes other criminal conduct, like the unauthorized possession of 
a firearm on an airplane,97 practically impossible for the general public 
who lacks the expertise to manufacture such a firearm themselves.98  
Examples of the latter approach include government mandates that Internet 
Service Providers (ISPs) prevent their customers from accessing websites 
that contain child pornography, as the State directly limits the technology 
that one might use to engage in the criminal conduct of possessing child 
pornography.99 
Though perfect prevention more easily targets those crimes that 
depend upon a technological intermediary for their commission, it is not 
necessarily so limited.  Chemical castration already aims to deprive 
individuals of their capacity to experience sexual desire or to engage in 
criminal sexual activity.100  Other pharmaceuticals target antisocial and 
racist thought processes.101  These advances presage the potential to make 
more “traditional” crimes like rape or murder practically impossible by 
limiting an individual’s capacity to form the desire to commit the targeted 
offense. 
III.  THE PERFECT PREVENTIVE STATE IS DIFFERENT 
The first important claim of this Article is that perfect prevention is 
different from punishment and prevention in ways that make the 
limitations placed on the punitive and preventive states inapposite to the 
perfect preventive state.  This Part develops that claim by addressing the 
punishment and prevention in turn.  It then discusses perfect prevention’s 
                                                                                                                          
are other examples of the State preventing criminal conduct by restricting access to enabling 
technology.   
96 18 U.S.C. § 922(p)(1). 
97 See 49 U.S.C. § 46505(b) (2012) (criminalizing the concealed carry of firearms on an aircraft). 
98 See Cory Doctorow, Congressman Calls for Ban on 3D Printed Guns, BOING BOING (Dec. 9, 
2012), http://boingboing.net/2012/12/09/congressman-calls-for-ban-on-3.html (suggesting that the 
Undetectable Firearms Act may require manufacturers of three-dimensional printers to make it 
impossible for their devices to be used to make plastic firearms).  
99 See Dawn C. Nunziato, How (Not) to Censor: Procedural First Amendment Values and 
Internet Censorship Worldwide, 42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1123, 1136–37 (2011) (discussing the use of this 
approach internationally).   
100 See John F. Stinneford, Incapacitation Through Maiming: Chemical Castration, the Eighth 
Amendment, and the Denial of Human Dignity, 3 U. ST. THOMAS. L. REV. 559, 573 (2006) (discussing 
how the chemical castration drug MPA reduces the brain’s exposure to testosterone, which results in a 
suppression of sexual desires that creates sexual apathy toward both deviant and non-deviant sexual 
acts). 
101 See Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, Genetic Predictions of Future Dangerousness: 
Is There a Blueprint for Violence?, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 301, 321 n.125 (2006) (recognizing 
the potential for drug therapy to suppress abnormal responses and desires); Sylvia Terbeck et al., 
Propranolol Reduces Implicit Negative Racial Bias, 222 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 419, 420, 422 (2012) 
(finding that the drug propranolol significantly reduced implicit racial bias). 
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similarity to precursors like the SCP movement, which seeks to prevent 
crime through changes to the environment.  Finally, it discusses how 
scholars have failed to develop sufficient justifications for, and limitations 
on, these precursors. 
A.  Perfect Prevention Is Not Punishment 
The punitive state imposes some unpleasantness on individuals who 
violate the State’s criminal laws.102  The task of identifying the specific 
contours of punishment’s justification has long occupied scholars, with 
various versions of retributivism and utilitarianism occupying the field.103  
A common thread in both retributive and utilitarian theories is that 
punishment can be justified only where the target of punishment has been 
adjudicated guilty of some crime.104  For the retributivist, the past offense 
requirement strictly delineates when and how much punishment is 
appropriate: an individual’s moral desert justifies and limits the 
punishment the State may impose, in that the State should punish the 
criminal as much, and only as much, as she deserves to be punished.105  
The utilitarian account’s relationship to a finding of guilt is more 
complex.106  Under this approach, punishment is justified only to the extent 
that its social benefit—in the form of specific deterrence, general 
deterrence, rehabilitation, or other social good—exceeds the harm it 
causes.107  Many retributivists criticize utilitarianism because it might 
justify the punishment of an innocent individual for an offense committed 
by another or for an offense that never occurred.108  But even if the 
                                                                                                                          
102 See H. L. A. HART, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND 
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1, 4 (1968) (defining punishment as something 
that must involve pain or other consequences normally considered unpleasant); Kent Greenawalt, 
Punishment, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 343, 343–44 (1983) (“In typical cases of punishment, 
persons who possess authority impose designedly unpleasant consequences upon, and express their 
condemnation of, other persons who are capable of choice and who have breached established 
standards of behavior.”). 
103 See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 454 
(1997) (discussing the broad grounds on which criminal punishment can be justified and the various 
versions of utilitarianism and retributivism). 
104 See Michael Tonry, Purposes and Functions of Sentencing, 34 CRIME & JUST. 1, 17 (2006) 
(discussing both retributive and utilitarian punishment as they apply to the “offender”). 
105 See id. at 16–17 (emphasizing the desirability of apportioning the severity of punishment to the 
offenders’ blameworthiness). 
106 See id. at 17–18 (discussing the utilitarian calculation of punishment that could justify a very 
serious punishment imposed “on an offender who committed a venial offense, or . . . on an innocent 
person whom everyone except the judge believed to be guilty”). 
107 See id. (explaining that the only constraint on punishment is the principle that no punishment 
should cause greater harm than it prevents). 
108 See, e.g., MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 93 
n.19 (1997) (“The main problem with the pure utilitarian theory of punishment is that it potentially 
sacrifices the innocent in order to achieve a collective good.”). 
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utilitarian account would allow for punishment of the innocent—a 
concession few utilitarians are willing to make—a finding that the 
punished individual committed some past offense, real or imagined, is still 
a necessary predicate of the punishment.109 
With this in mind, perfect prevention obviously cannot be justified on 
the same grounds as punishment or limited by the same principles.  Perfect 
prevention restricts individual liberty before the criminal act occurs.  Thus, 
there is no past offense and no moral desert to provide the threshold 
justification for the intrusion on liberty.  Likewise, punishment’s 
requirement of proportionality to moral desert provides no limitation on the 
perfect preventive state. 
B.  Perfect Prevention Is Not Prevention 
The preventive state “attempt[s] to identify and neutralize dangerous 
individuals before they commit crimes by restricting their liberty in a 
variety of ways.”110  Prevention has a long history, with the civil 
commitment of the dangerous and mentally ill tracing its roots back to 
common law.111  It has come into vogue recently as federal and state 
governments have sought to expand their authority to civilly commit 
sexually-violent predators and terrorists.112  The liberty restrictions 
employed by the preventive state can range both in terms of severity and 
time, from the brief detention for police questioning authorized by Terry v. 
Ohio113 to potentially indefinite incarceration114 or even death.115  
The preventive state’s authority derives from the government’s police 
                                                                                                                          
109 See Herbert Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1097, 1105 
(1952) (recognizing that “invocation of a penal sanction necessarily depends on past behavior” even 
when “the object is control of harmful conduct in the future”). 
110 Steiker, supra note 4, at 774. 
111 See Klein, supra note 28, at 566–67 (“Under the common law, dangerousness was a necessary 
finding for civil commitment.  People were confined if mad and dangerous; those who were mad but 
not dangerous remained in the community.” (footnotes omitted)). 
112 See Robert M. Chesney, supra note 11, at 26 (discussing the Justice and Defense Departments’ 
incapacitation of suspected terrorists through military and criminal detention); Eric S. Janus, The 
Preventive State, Terrorists and Sexual Predators: Countering the Threat of a New Outsider 
Jurisprudence, 40 CRIM. L. BULL. 576, 576–77 (2004) (discussing radical prevention, which seeks to 
intervene when there is a risk of future harm and does so by curtailing a person’s liberty before harm 
results). 
113 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968). 
114 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997) (holding the potentially indefinite 
detention of sexually violent predators to be constitutional). 
115 Though no state permits the implementation of the death penalty solely on the basis of a 
finding of future dangerousness, the Supreme Court has approved of the use of future dangerousness as 
a factor to be considered in capital sentencing.  Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976); see also 
Robinson, supra note 4, at 1430 n.4 (listing jurisdictions that consider dangerousness in sentencing). 
 902 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:883 
power to ensure public safety.116  This justification provides the first of two 
substantive limits on the preventive state: the State must establish that the 
individual who is subject to a preventive intrusion on her liberty is 
dangerous.117  The range in severity of possible intrusions from the 
preventive state correlates to the finding of dangerousness required to 
justify the intrusion.118  Preventive detention, which interferes with the 
“individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical 
restraint,” is justified under the due process clause upon a finding of 
volitional impairment and dangerousness pursuant to “proper procedures 
and evidentiary standards.”119  Meanwhile, a Terry stop, during which a 
person is restrained for only a brief period of time,120 is justified upon mere 
reasonable suspicion that the target is or has been engaged in criminal 
activity.121 
The second substantive limitation on the preventive state cabins its use 
to narrow subcategories of the dangerous, including pretrial detainees, 
immigrants facing deportation, and the mentally ill.122  If there is a single 
unifying justification for how to define the categories of dangerous people 
who are subject to prevention, it is that the threat they pose to public safety 
                                                                                                                          
116 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979) (“[T]he state also has authority under its 
police power to protect the community from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill.”).  
This is actually an oversimplification, as the police power belongs only to the states, United States v. 
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1967 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring), while the federal government’s 
authority to prevent crime must derive from its enumerated powers, see id. at 1956 (majority opinion) 
(concluding that the Federal Government’s enumerated powers grant Congress legislative power 
sufficient to enact a law that allows a district court to order civil commitment of a mentally ill, sexually 
dangerous federal prisoner beyond the date he would otherwise be released).  This distinction is of little 
practical significance in this context, as the federal government’s preventive authority generally derives 
from concerns about public safety that relate to its specifically enumerated powers.  See id. at 1959–60 
(discussing the history of civil commitment under federal law and the animating concern that mentally 
ill and dangerous former federal prisoners might threaten public safety). 
117 See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357 (“States have in certain narrow circumstances provided for the 
forcible civil detainment of people who are unable to control their behavior and who thereby pose a 
danger to the public health and safety.  We have consistently upheld such involuntary commitment 
statutes provided the confinement takes place pursuant to proper procedures and evidentiary standards.”  
(citations omitted)).  Of course, all people can be said to be “dangerous” in the sense that any conscious 
person is physically capable of engaging in violent crime at any moment.  At the same time, every 
person is entitled to a presumption of harmlessness, and the State therefore bears the burden of making 
some individualized showing of dangerousness before preemptively restricting an individual’s liberty.  
See Michael Louis Corrado, Punishment and the Wild Beast of Prey: The Problem of Preventive 
Detention, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 778, 804–05 (1996) (arguing that it is necessary to show 
culpability to make a finding of dangerousness). 
118 See Slobogin, supra note 14, at 50–53 (proposing a “proportionality principle” to govern the 
amount of dangerousness that must be proven to justify preventive action).   
119 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 356–57. 
120 See United States v. Swanson, 341 F.3d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 2003) (explaining that during a 
Terry stop, an officer may only ask “a moderate number of questions”). 
121 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). 
122  See Adam Klein & Benjamin Wittes, Preventive Detention in American Theory and Practice, 
2 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 85, 87 (2011) (cataloguing examples of preventive detention). 
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cannot be deterred adequately by the punitive state.123  Thus, the Supreme 
Court has held that the State can civilly commit sexual predators only if 
they have some mental illness or abnormality that creates a “serious 
difficulty in controlling behavior.”124  Similarly, pretrial detention solves a 
problem—flight by dangerous individuals charged with serious crimes— 
for which ex post punishment is ill-suited; after all, when a defendant flees, 
she cannot be punished for either the underlying offense or the subsequent 
crime of flight.125 
This limitation does not derive from, and indeed undermines, the 
public safety justification for the preventive state, as the public would be 
safer if all dangerous people were preventively detained.  Instead, the 
Supreme Court has explained that the requirement of mental illness is 
necessary in the sexual predator context to ensure that prevention does not 
“‘become a mechanism for retribution or general deterrence’—functions 
properly those of criminal law.”126  In other words, it ensures that ex post 
punishment remains the preferred avenue for preventing crime.127  This 
preference is based on the understanding that punishment better respects 
individual autonomy by restricting liberty only after an individual has 
chosen to break the law.128 
Neither limitation on the preventive state provides useful guidance for 
the proper implementation of perfect prevention, however.  First, because 
perfect prevention targets only criminal conduct, it by definition advances 
the State’s interest in public safety and falls within the State’s police 
power.129  Consequently, there is no need for an additional limitation on 
perfect prevention, like the dangerousness limitation on the preventive 
state, to ensure that perfect prevention serves the State’s interest in 
protecting its citizens.  Second, the limitation of prevention to only those 
individuals who cannot be handled adequately by the punitive state is 
inapposite to perfect prevention.  Perfect prevention targets criminal 
conduct no matter who engages in it and does not limit specific classes of 
                                                                                                                          
123 See id. at 88 (claiming that “American law eschews [preventive detention] except where 
legislatures and courts deem it necessary to prevent grave public harms”).   
124 Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 409, 412–13 (2002).   
125 Schulhofer, supra note 9, at 86–87. 
126 Crane, 534 U.S. at 412 (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 372–73 (1997)); see also 
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360 (noting that a “lack of volitional control” adequately distinguished the 
detainee “from other dangerous persons who [were] perhaps more properly dealt with exclusively 
through criminal proceedings”). 
127 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360. 
128 See Ferzan, supra note 3, at 152–53 (explaining that theorists “decry the denial of the potential 
offender’s autonomy” when “we wish to substantially interfere with an individual’s liberty to prevent 
him from harming us”). 
129 See Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136 (1894) (noting that “[t]he police power . . . is 
universally conceded to include everything essential to the public safety”). 
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individuals.130  Moreover, it is not immediately obvious that punishment is 
more respectful of autonomy than perfect prevention, and thus there is no 
per se preference for punishment over perfect prevention.131 
C.  Predecessors of Perfect Prevention 
The idea of preventing crime by removing criminal conduct from the 
range of choices available to the potential criminal is not new.  For 
example, the SCP movement seeks to “reduce the opportunities for crime 
and increase its risks” through the “management, design, or manipulation 
of the immediate environment in as systematic and permanent a way as 
possible.”132  In a similar vein, Neal Kumar Katyal discusses the use of 
architecture for the purposes of crime control by focusing on four 
architectural mechanisms: natural surveillance, territoriality, building 
community, and strengthening targets.133  Katyal also argues for 
consideration of analogous mechanisms to prevent cybercrime.134  
Meanwhile, Edward Cheng contends that the government should use 
structure to prevent crimes like speeding and music piracy.135 
These structural and architectural approaches to crime control overlap 
in part with perfect prevention in that they involve generally applicable 
State mandates that aim to make specific criminal conduct practically 
impossible, rather than merely costly.  For instance, more than forty years 
ago John Decker studied the effectiveness of new parking meters in New 
York City that aimed to prevent the illegal use of “slugs” instead of coins 
in the meters.136  The meters were a success, markedly reducing the 
targeted criminal activity,137 and an advocate of SCP rightly trumpets the 
anti-slug meters as a success story of “[t]arget [h]ardening.”138  The meters 
also are an example of perfect prevention: they were installed by the 
                                                                                                                          
130 One can imagine a hybrid between prevention and perfect prevention that aims to make it 
practically impossible for specific individuals to engage in targeted criminal conduct, but consideration 
of such an approach is outside the scope of this Article.  See infra Part IV. 
131 The nature and extent of perfect prevention’s intrusion on individual liberty and the proper 
preference between punishment and prevention are both explored in more detail below.  See supra 
Parts IV.A, IV.C. 
132 Clarke, supra note 47, at 91. 
133 See Katyal, supra note 48, at 1048, 1050–71 (describing “Natural Surveillance,” 
“Territoriality,” “Building Community,” and “Strengthening Targets”). 
134 See Katyal, supra note 49, at 2286 (suggesting the use of software and performance standards 
to enforce cybersecurity). 
135 See Cheng, supra note 50, at 689, 691–92, 694, 703–14 (suggesting structures such as “copy 
protection technology”). 
136 John F. Decker, Curbside Deterrence? An Analysis of the Effect of a Slug-Rejector Device, 
Coin-View Window and Warning Labels on Slug Usage in New York City Parking Meters, 10 
CRIMINOLOGY 127, 128–29 (1972). 
137 Id. at 133. 
138 Clarke, supra note 47, at 110. 
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government, they target criminal conduct, and they seek to make the 
targeted conduct practically impossible.139 
But even though perfect prevention has a long history under the 
umbrellas of SCP and architectural or structural crime control, scholarly 
attention to the proper limits of the government’s power to mandate the use 
of crime prevention technologies has been scant.  This failure is 
attributable in part to inherent characteristics of perfect prevention.  First, 
structural controls aim to prevent only criminal conduct,140 and few goals 
are more politically palatable than crime prevention.141  Second, structural 
controls do not intrude on individual liberty in the obvious fashions of 
prevention and punishment.142  Thus, structural regulations are easy to laud 
as a solution to the problems caused by these more traditional crime-
prevention methods.143  Third, the crime reduction benefits of structural 
controls are statistically quantifiable,144 but the impact of perfect 
prevention on individual liberty is diffuse and indeterminate as everyone is 
prevented from doing something—committing a crime—that they have no 
right to do in the first place.145  As a result, it is easy to trumpet the 
successes of structural crime control while giving little attention to the 
potential downsides and proper limitations.146 
Nonetheless, some scholars have grappled with the downsides of the 
perfect preventive state, even though most have fallen short of suggesting 
                                                                                                                          
139 Decker, supra note 136, at 131. 
140 See, e.g., Katyal, supra note 48, at 1041 (“[A]dditional attention to cities, neighborhoods, and 
individual buildings can reduce criminal activity.”). 
141 See, e.g., Darren DaRonco, Ex-Tucson Mayoral Hopeful Plans Free Shotguns for High-Crime 
Areas, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Mar. 27, 2013, at State and Regional News (showing that crime prevention 
is so popular that a politician has proposed, as his political platform, providing free shotguns to 
residents to prevent crime).  But see Steven P. Lab, Crime Prevention, Politics, and the Art of Going 
Nowhere Fast, 21 JUST. Q. 681, 682–84 (2004) (arguing that politicians focus on arresting, prosecuting, 
and punishing offenders instead of activities “designed to reduce the actual level of crime” because 
“crime prevention . . . is not politically expedient”). 
142 See supra Part II.B. 
143 See Cheng, supra note 50, at 664–65 (“Because structure . . . is largely self-executing, it 
minimizes many of the problems that plague fiat regimes.”). 
144 See, e.g., id. at 677–78 (arguing for the success of structural controls on tax evasion by 
pointing to data about the revenue lost due to noncompliance for various income categories); Katyal, 
supra note 48, at 1070 (trumpeting the success of traffic barriers in certain areas of Los Angeles that 
reduced assaults “from 190 to 163 in the first year, and from 163 to 138 in the next year”). 
145 See, e.g., Alexander & Ferzan, supra note 61, at 641 (arguing that making crime more difficult 
to commit “does not interfere with the rightful liberty” of potential criminals); Corrado, supra note 117, 
at 808 (“Exclusion from someone else’s property is likewise not a denial of anything the actor has a 
right to—particularly if his only reason for being there would be to harm another.”). 
146 See, e.g., Clarke, supra note 47, at 134–35 (discussing “supposed infringements of 
constitutional liberties” resulting from SCP); Barry Poyner, What Works in Crime Prevention: An 
Overview of Evaluations, 1 CRIME PREVENTION STUD. 13, 15–16 (1993) (rating studies of SCP 
techniques on the sole basis of whether they showed a reduction in crime). 
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concrete limitations on government power.147  Katyal, for instance, 
recognized that architectural crime prevention techniques may raise 
concerns about social control and individual privacy.148  His response to 
these concerns is two-fold.  First, he encourages government action to 
enhance privacy.149  Second, Katyal argues that regulation through 
architecture is inevitable and that government use of architecture is 
preferable to private action because it “can be more responsible and far 
more transparent than private decisionmaking.”150  Both points are valid, as 
far as they go,151 but neither addresses how to ensure that the perfect 
preventive state is not misused.  Similarly, Cheng analyzed how structural 
crime control might threaten individual interests in privacy and 
autonomy,152 but he avoided the question of limits on perfect prevention.  
Instead, he ultimately concluded that “a greater use of structural laws 
would in fact require a shift in democratic values” away from individual 
rights and toward communitarian interests.153 
However, the same characteristics that make perfect prevention 
resistant to scholarly criticism also highlight the need for discussion of 
proper limitations on it.  Like the preventive and punitive states, perfect 
prevention is justified by the government’s obligation to protect the 
public.154  Public safety garners strong political support, thus creating a 
push to expand government authority to prevent crime.  In the context of 
punishment and prevention, this push is counterbalanced to some extent by 
concern about the infringement on individual liberties.  Criminal legal 
theory provides a rich source for discussion of individual liberties in the 
context of crime control, but few theorists have seriously tackled the 
                                                                                                                          
147 See Rich, supra note 46, at 805–28 (cataloguing costs and benefits of perfect preventive 
measures). 
148 Katyal, supra note 48, at 1128–33. 
149 For example, Katyal suggests the creation of “semipublic spaces that mediate the tension 
between an atomized group of individuals and a collective and undifferentiated mass.”  Id. at 1129. 
150 Id. at 1132. 
151 Certainly, in an ideal world governments will act to maximize individual privacy and minimize 
invidious social control and will do so with maximum transparency, but recent experience teaches that 
limitations on government power are necessary.  See, e.g., Charlie Savage et al., U.S. Confirms That It 
Gathers Online Data Overseas, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2013, at A1 (discussing acknowledgement by the 
United States government that it collected massive amounts of data on domestic and foreign phone 
calls). 
152 See Cheng, supra note 50, at 669–73 (exploring whether “the legislative aversion to structural 
laws may derive from concerns about their impact on personal freedom” in the context of “surveillance 
and violations of privacy”). 
153 Id. at 671. 
154 See Andrew Ashworth & Lucia Zedner, Preventive Orders: A Problem of 
Undercriminalization?, in THE BOUNDARIES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 59, 71 (R.A. Duff et al. eds., 
2010) (“The ostensible rationale for such [preventive] measures is usually claimed to reside in 
protecting the public or averting risk of harm, not in past wrongdoing.”); Katyal, supra note 48, at 1046 
(calling on “government [to] draw upon all constraints on crime . . . to have maximum impact”). 
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question of how perfect prevention might intrude on these liberties and 
when such intrusion might be justified.155  Instead, some view prevention 
of criminal conduct as a brick on the road to a science-fiction dystopia,156 
while others scoff at the idea that perfect prevention would intrude on any 
meaningful rights.157  A thoughtful consideration of the impact of perfect 
prevention on individual rights is needed instead to counterbalance the 
politically-attractive goal of crime prevention and to help trace some limits 
on the proper scope of its use.158 
IV.  LIMITS ON THE PERFECT PREVENTIVE STATE 
This Part identifies three concerns that might be raised with the use of 
perfect prevention and discusses limits on the perfect preventive state that 
respond to those concerns.  The first concern is that perfect prevention 
interferes with individual autonomy.  The second concern is that by 
treating everyone the same, perfect prevention treats all people like 
criminals.  The third concern asks whether and in what circumstances 
perfect prevention should be preferred over punishment or prevention as a 
means of preventing certain criminal conduct. 
A.  The Autonomy Concern 
The punitive and preventive states are subject to substantive and 
procedural due process limitations because they impinge on individual 
liberty.159  For instance, the State can punish an individual only if it had 
placed the individual on notice that her conduct was forbidden,160 provided 
proper procedural protections to the individual in finding her guilty of the 
                                                                                                                          
155 See Andrew von Hirsch & Clifford Shearing, Exclusion from Public Space, in ETHICAL AND 
SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION 77, 82–85 (Andrew von Hirsch et al. eds., 
2000) (arguing that situational crime prevention should respect an individual’s liberty of movement). 
156 See Husak, supra note 2, at 215–16 (discussing the difficulties of social control). 
157 See Marcus Felson & Ronald V. Clarke, The Ethics of Situational Crime Prevention, in 
RATIONAL CHOICE AND SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION: THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 197, 208 
(Graeme Newman et al. eds., 1997) (“It is remarkable to us that situational prevention should draw 
criticism for neglecting individual rights when the most usual alternative is to try harder to arrest 
people and remove their freedom altogether.”). 
158 See Ashworth & Zedner, supra note 154, at 73–74 (“[W]hat matters in a society that is—or 
wishes to . . . become—a liberal democracy is not that we control crime but how we do so.” (quoting 
Ian Loader, The Anti-Politics of Crime, 12 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 399, 405 (2008)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
159 See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dept. of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989) (“[I]t is the 
State’s affirmative act of restraining the individual’s freedom to act on his own behalf—through 
incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty—which is the 
‘deprivation of liberty’ triggering the protections of the Due Process Clause.”); Addington v. Texas, 
441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (“This Court repeatedly has recognized that civil commitment for any 
purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.”). 
160 See Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 350–51 (1964) (presenting the “basic principle 
that a criminal statute must give fair warning of the conduct that makes it a crime”). 
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offense,161 and chose a punishment for the criminal conduct that was 
proportional to the crime.162  Similarly, the State can use the tools of the 
preventive state only upon a proper individualized finding that the target of 
the State’s power endangers society’s interests.163  In either case, the 
substantive and procedural limitations on the State’s power are roughly 
proportional to the extent of the resulting interference with the individual’s 
autonomy.  In the punitive context, this explains why entitlement to a jury 
trial or the assistance of counsel depends on the extent of the deprivation of 
liberty to which the defendant may be subject.164  And the State’s burden of 
proving an individual’s dangerousness increases in proportion to the extent 
of the proposed preventive deprivation of her liberty.165 
But what is obvious about punishment and prevention—that they must 
be subject to limitations because they intrude on legitimate exercises of 
individual autonomy—is not so clear with respect to perfect prevention.166  
Even in their most limited applications, both the punitive and preventive 
states engage in “blunderbuss interventions”167 on liberty, by which an 
individual is deprived of the freedom to engage in a wide swath of legal 
activity in order to prevent criminal conduct.168  For instance, in a punitive 
or preventive state, an individual who is imprisoned or preventively 
detained is prevented from committing most crimes, but she also loses the 
freedom to see friends, travel, or shop at the grocery store.  Perfect 
prevention, on the other hand, aims to prevent individuals from engaging 
in criminal conduct and only criminal conduct.169  This makes perfect 
                                                                                                                          
161 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VI (guaranteeing rights to trial and confrontation of witnesses). 
162 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008). 
163 See supra notes 116–21 and accompanying text (citing cases in which the federal government 
uses its preventive authority to protect societal interests). 
164 See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972) (requiring that counsel be provided “when 
one’s liberty is in jeopardy”); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161–62 (1968) (holding that a jury 
trial is required for crimes punishable by two years in prison). 
165 See supra notes 116–18 and accompanying text (describing the necessity that criminal 
behavior be dangerous before it justifies preventive action). 
166 Maybe for this reason, when scholars do express concern over crime prevention technologies, 
their concerns are often vague.  See Husak, supra note 2, at 215 (“The concept of punishment is vague 
and allows for many borderline cases.”). 
167 Stephen J. Morse, Blame and Danger: An Essay on Preventive Detention, 76 B.U. L. REV. 
113, 117 (1996). 
168 See Corrado, supra note 117, at 808 (discussing the differences in restraints on liberty between 
preventive detention and a restraining order); Schulhofer, supra note 9, at 93 (analyzing preventive 
detention’s interference with an individual’s capacity to lead a free life). 
169 In this way, perfect prevention appears analogous to the digital “worm” hypothesized by 
Lawrence Lessig that would be deployed by the government to search private computers and could 
identify only contraband, LESSIG, supra note 53, at 17–19, or other “binary search[es]” that reveal only 
the presence of contraband, see Timothy C. MacDonnell, Orwellian Ramifications: The Contraband 
Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 299, 302 (2012) (defining the binary search 
doctrine); Ric Simmons, The Two Unanswered Questions of Illinois v. Caballes: How to Make the 
World Safe for Binary Searches, 80 TUL. L. REV. 411, 424 (2005) (explaining the history of the “binary 
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prevention’s offense to autonomy less clear because people have no 
legitimate autonomy interest in committing a crime, either as a matter of 
legal doctrine170 or theory.171  For instance, when police stop a person on 
the steps of a bank who is wearing a mask and carrying a gun and prevent 
her from robbing the bank, we do not complain that they have improperly 
intruded on her autonomy.172 
Thus, to discuss perfect prevention’s impact on individual autonomy, 
we must first pinpoint what, if any, legitimate autonomy interest is at stake.  
Once that interest has been identified, we next must determine what limits 
should be imposed on the perfect preventive state as a result.  This section 
addresses these issues in turn. 
1.  The Legitimate Interest in Deciding Whether to Break the Law 
To answer the question of what legitimate autonomy interest might be 
threatened by perfect prevention, it is helpful to consider again the 
autonomy interests that are threatened by the preventive state.  As noted, 
prevention generally and preventive detention specifically are obviously 
problematic because they intrude on an individual’s legitimate autonomy 
interest in engaging in a broad range of lawful activities.173  The concern 
with preventive detention, however, goes deeper than this.  When the State 
preemptively restricts the liberty of responsible individuals, it “fails to treat 
                                                                                                                          
search” in Supreme Court case law).  Unfortunately, the primary concern of critics of the contraband 
exception is inapplicable in the perfect prevention context.  Both scholars and Supreme Court Justices 
fear that allowing searches like Lessig’s “worm” will lead to an Orwellian world in which citizens must 
assume that they are constantly under surveillance and any deviation from the law will be immediately 
punished.  See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 138 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(presenting the dangers of these surveillance techniques); MacDonnell, supra, at 300–01 (describing 
the “binary search” doctrine in which “individuals have no right to privacy in contraband, regardless of 
the location”).  As described, such punishment would then lead to substantial intrusion on legitimate 
autonomy interests.  But that concern simply brings us back to the distinction between punishment and 
perfect prevention and the original question of whether perfect prevention intrudes on any legitimate 
autonomy interest. 
170 See Daniel R. Dinger, Should Parents Be Allowed to Record a Child’s Telephone 
Conversations When They Believe the Child Is in Danger?: An Examination of the Federal Wiretap 
Statute and the Doctrine of Vicarious Consent in the Context of a Criminal Prosecution, 28 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 955, 1024 n.367 (2005) (citing cases so holding); see also Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123 
(majority opinion) (holding that a test that discloses only whether a particular substance is contraband 
does not intrude on a legitimate privacy interest). 
171 See Ferzan, supra note 3, at 178 (“We certainly do not claim that criminals ought to have 
unfettered ability to commit crime and that any restrictions on that freedom interfere with their 
autonomy.”). 
172 How, precisely, the law should deal with this individual is nevertheless a matter of substantial 
debate.  See, e.g., Alexander & Ferzan, supra note 61, at 641–60 (arguing against using the criminal 
law to punish incomplete attempts); Ferzan, supra note 3, at 178 (arguing that “[p]rotecting citizens’ 
security is a good reason for State interference”). 
173 See Corrado, supra note 117, at 808 (discussing the limitations on the actor’s freedom with a 
restraining order); Schulhofer, supra note 9, at 93 (suggesting that the criminal process is most 
effective for those societies committed to individual liberty). 
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the person as an autonomous moral agent who can be guided by reason.”174  
This “bad bacteria” approach to personhood treats people merely as 
“potentially beneficial or harmful objects.”175  Christopher Slobogin terms 
this critique the “dehumanization objection” to prevention.176  Specifically, 
prevention fails to acknowledge that the ability to choose whether to abide 
by the law is unique and essential to one’s humanity.177  To put it another 
way, prevention of a responsible agent is offensive because it deprives her 
of the opportunity to decide whether to obey the law.178 
Thus, the preventive state threatens two legitimate autonomy interests: 
the interest in engaging in lawful conduct and the interest in choosing 
whether to break the law.  The first is obvious and uncontroversial, while 
the second has generally evaded substantial discussion by scholars179 and 
might strike some as troublesome on its face.180  Nevertheless, the 
existence of the latter interest finds ample support in criminal and 
constitutional law principles.   
In criminal law, the requirement of a voluntary act is a recognition that 
“a civilized society does not punish for thoughts alone.”181  That rule in 
turn is a manifestation of the “inalienable right[],” to be free in one’s 
                                                                                                                          
174 Morse, supra note 15, at 1122. 
175 Morse, supra note 3, at 57. 
176 Slobogin, supra note 14, at 27. 
177 See Cole, supra note 9, at 696 (“We generally presume that individuals have a choice to 
conform their conduct to the law.”); Slobogin, supra note 14, at 27 (“The capacity to choose one’s 
course is an essential aspect of our notion of what it means to be human.”). 
178 See R.A. Duff, Dangerousness and Citizenship, in FUNDAMENTALS OF SENTENCING THEORY: 
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ANDREW VON HIRSCH 141, 149 (Andrew Ashworth & Martin Wasik eds., 1998) 
(arguing that preventive detention of the responsible is inconsistent with respect for individual 
autonomy because it “does not leave citizens free to decide for themselves whether to obey the law”); 
Alec Walen, A Unified Theory of Detention, with Application to Preventive Detention for Suspected 
Terrorists, 70 MD. L. REV. 871, 881 (2011) (arguing that the State “must let those [dangerous] 
individuals have the chance to exercise their free will to choose rightly or wrongly, as long as it is 
sufficiently likely that they can be held accountable if they choose wrongly”). 
179 See, e.g., Alec Walen, Criminalizing Statements of Terrorist Intent: How to Understand the 
Law Governing Terrorist Threats, and Why It Should Be Used Instead of Long-Term Preventive 
Detention, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 803, 838–40 (2011) (discussing the manner in which 
“freedom of thought must include the freedom to choose to indulge any thoughts one wants to 
indulge”). 
180 For instance, then-Vice President Richard Nixon said, in the context of the civil rights 
movement, “the deterioration [of respect for the rule of law] can be traced directly to the spread of the 
corrosive doctrine that every citizen possesses an inherent right to decide for himself which laws to 
obey and when to disobey them.”  KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN 
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS 31 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
181 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 cmt. 1, at 214 (1985); see also JOSHUA DRESSLER, 
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 373 (6th ed. 2012) (“[P]eople are not punished for thoughts alone.”); 
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 49 (1998) (“Everyone seems to agree that 
it would be a perversion of the institution [of criminal justice] to punish in the absence of action—for 
thoughts alone.”); Deborah W. Denno, Crime and Consciousness: Science and Involuntary Acts, 87 
MINN. L. REV. 269, 282 (2002) (“The maxim that civilized societies should not punish individuals for 
their ‘thoughts alone’ has existed for three centuries.”). 
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thoughts, which is embodied in the First Amendment.182  As Justice 
Cardozo recognized, the “freedom of thought, and speech . . . is the matrix, 
the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom.”183  
Thus, the Supreme Court has rejected the government’s use of a 
defendant’s “abstract beliefs” to enhance his sentence184 and has 
overturned a criminal conviction for private possession of obscene 
materials on the ground that “control[ling] the moral content of a person’s 
thoughts . . . is wholly inconsistent with the philosophy of the First 
Amendment.”185  Similarly, constitutional rights to free speech, privacy, 
and substantive due process can be seen to protect “deliberative 
autonomy,” or an individual’s ability to formulate opinions and make 
decisions based on a maximum amount of information.186  Thus, speech 
that does not appeal to or support rational decision making—such as 
fighting words, incitement, and libel—is entitled to less constitutional 
protection.187 
The importance of civil disobedience—lawbreaking as political 
protest—as an engine of social change in America also supports the 
existence of a legitimate autonomy interest in deciding to break the law.188  
Protests that deliberately violate laws that are thought to conflict with 
deeper moral imperatives serve a useful social purpose by drawing needed 
attention to problems that have escaped social recognition.189  Such 
protests have been the catalyst for the expansion of civil rights and other 
reforms in the United States.190  But of course such protests cannot occur 
unless the protestor can exercise her autonomy and choose to break the 
                                                                                                                          
182 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2550 (2012); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (stating that the First Amendment includes a penumbra of inalienable rights). 
183 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326–27 (1937); see also Charles Fried, The New First 
Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 225, 233 (1992) (“I cede authority 
to the state to draw the necessary concrete boundaries between our respective spheres of action.  But no 
such necessity requires, indeed self-respect forbids, that I cede to the state the authority to limit my use 
of my rational powers.”). 
184 Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 167 (1992). 
185 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565–66 (1969). 
186 See Aditi Bagchi, Deliberative Autonomy and Legitimate State Purpose Under the First 
Amendment, 68 ALB. L. REV. 815, 815–17 (2005) (discussing the right to free speech in the context of 
deliberative autonomy); James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2 
(1995) (propounding a constitutional theory on the ground of securing deliberative autonomy). 
187 See Christina E. Wells, Reinvigorating Autonomy: Freedom and Responsibility in the Supreme 
Court’s First Amendment Jurisprudence, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159, 177–86 (1997) (outlining 
the different types of protected speech and the level of protection afforded to each). 
188 See Matthew R. Hall, Guilty but Civilly Disobedient: Reconciling Civil Disobedience and the 
Rule of Law, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2083, 2085–92 (2007) (articulating a philosophy of civil 
disobedience, including the conscientious violation of the law and acceptance of punishment). 
189 Id. at 2095. 
190 Id. at 2094; see Rich, supra note 46, at 826–27 (describing the burning of draft cards and sit-
ins as criminal conduct that “benefit[ted] society”).  
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law.191 
Though it seems clear that there is some legitimate autonomy interest 
in deciding whether to break the law rooted in freedom of thought, it is 
somewhat harder to define its contours.192  To that end, I make three claims 
about the scope of the interest.  First, the interest in deciding whether to 
break the law encompasses anything that occurs within an individual’s 
mind193 and does not involve a voluntary physical manifestation of the 
individual’s thoughts.194  Thus, one has a legitimate autonomy interest in 
fantasies, thoughts, desires, plans, and intentions that involve illegal 
activity.195  As soon as one voluntarily engages in some conduct to make 
                                                                                                                          
191 Cf. William P. Marshall, Truth and the Religion Clauses, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 243, 248 (1994) 
(“When the laws of the state conflict with religious duties, the believer must choose between obeying 
her government’s laws or following her religious obligations.”).  Note that the necessity of an 
autonomy interest in deciding whether to break the law is a separate question from the much thornier 
issue of whether law-breaking in the name of civil disobedience should be punished.  See, e.g., Eduardo 
Moisés Peñalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1095, 1158–60 (2007) 
(recognizing that the failure of the State to punish those who engage in civil disobedience would 
undermine the expressive value of their conduct). 
192 See Recent Case, Constitutional Law—Freedom of Thought—Seventh Circuit Upholds City’s 
Order Banning Former Sex Offender from Public Parks, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1054, 1054 (2005) (“[I]t 
seems clear that there is a constitutional right to freedom of thought, but the scope and contours of this 
right are poorly developed.”).  The failure of scholars to articulate the right to freedom of thought more 
clearly makes sense in light of traditional technological limitations on the State’s ability to intrude on 
an individual’s thoughts.  Marc Jonathan Blitz, Freedom of Thought for the Extended Mind: Cognitive 
Enhancement and the Constitution, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1049, 1051 (recognizing that there has been “no 
reason for the law to protect our private, unexpressed thoughts because such internal thoughts were, in 
any case, beyond the reach of the state”).  Moreover, such a discussion has been unnecessary in the 
context of the preventive state, because most tools of prevention intrude so broadly on individual 
autonomy that any limitation on an individual’s thoughts could be lumped together with the more 
obvious limitations on her freedom to engage in lawful activities.  Nevertheless, at least one scholar has 
attempted to articulate the scope of, and boundaries on, the freedom of thought.  Id.; see also Marc 
Jonathan Blitz, The Freedom of 3D Thought: The First Amendment in Virtual Reality, 30 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1141, 1150–52 (2008) (articulating a theory of freedom of thought in the context of virtual reality 
experiences). 
193 On this point, I disagree with Alec Walen, who argues that “the law can criminalize choosing 
to form an intention to pursue a criminal plan of action without criminalizing mere thought.”  Walen, 
supra note 179, at 839 (emphasis omitted).  Walen’s argument depends on a distinction he draws 
between conceiving or evaluating an idea, which he calls “mere thought,” and choosing to engage in 
action, which he considers something more.  Id. at 838 (emphasis omitted).  Though I agree that 
choosing to do something is different than conceiving or evaluating an idea, I do not see how the 
former takes what occurs merely in one’s mind out of the realm of “mere thought” and thus outside of 
the protection of the freedom of thought. 
194 Thus, the involuntary physical manifestations that may accompany criminal thoughts, such as 
increased heart rate or changes in skin temperature, are also protected by the autonomy interest in 
deciding whether to break the law. 
195 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (“The makers of our Constitution undertook 
to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. . . . They sought to protect Americans in their 
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.” (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 
U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Steven J. Heyman, 
Spheres of Autonomy: Reforming the Content Neutrality Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 
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those thoughts real, however, she is no longer within the scope of her 
legitimate autonomy interest in deciding whether to break the law.196  
Second, conditioning one’s liberty to engage in otherwise legal conduct on 
whether she wishes to later break the law intrudes on that person’s 
legitimate autonomy interest in deciding whether to break the law.  This 
claim is a corollary to the more general proposition that the State infringes 
on a freedom when it denies a benefit or forbids conduct otherwise 
permitted to all on the basis of an individual’s exercise of that freedom.197  
Third, because the autonomy interest in deciding whether to break the law 
involves deliberative autonomy, the meaningful exercise of that autonomy 
requires that an individual have access to as much legitimately relevant 
information as possible.198 
The next section explores the implications of these claims.  One issue 
still remains, however.  Though there is a legitimate autonomy interest in 
deciding whether to break the law, which stems from the freedom of 
thought protected under the First Amendment, this does not mean that the 
State can never intrude on that interest.  Even the most fundamental 
constitutional rights can be restricted when the State’s interest in doing so 
is great enough.199  The question remains, then, of when state interests 
might overcome an individual’s legitimate autonomy interest in deciding 
                                                                                                                          
10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 647, 657 (2002) (“[A] central tenet of liberalism is that a boundary must 
be drawn between the outward realm of the state and the inward life of the individual.”). 
196 The distinction that I draw here between those things that occur internal to one’s mind and the 
voluntary physical manifestations of those internal mental processes does not mean that thoughts 
cannot constitute acts or even culpable acts.  See ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 4, at 200–10 
(discussing whether intentions are acts or culpable acts).  Rather, I contend that even if mental 
processes can be culpable acts, they are covered by the freedom of thought and the legitimate autonomy 
interest in deciding whether to break the law. 
197 See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996) (“[O]ur modern 
‘unconstitutional conditions’ doctrine holds that the government ‘may not deny a benefit to a person on 
a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected . . . freedom of speech’ even if he has no entitlement 
to that benefit.” (second alteration in original) (quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 
(1972))); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495–96 (1961) (holding that a religious test for public 
office violated the “freedom of belief and religion,” even though “a person is not compelled to hold 
public office”). 
198 See, e.g., Benjamin Moulton & Jamie S. King, Aligning Ethics with Medical Decision-Making: 
The Quest for Informed Patient Choice, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 85, 87 (2010) (noting that the American 
Medical Association requires that physicians disclose all relevant medical information to their 
patients); Todd E. Pettys, The Immoral Application of Exclusionary Rules, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 463, 492 
(“When our exclusionary rules operate to conceal relevant, readily available information from a jury—
which is precisely what those rules typically are designed to do—we infringe on jurors’ deliberative 
autonomy . . . .”); Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of the Attorney-Client Relationship: The 
Argument for Autonomy, 65 N.C. L. REV.  315, 340–41 (1987) (discussing autonomy in the context of 
information disclosure in the attorney-client relationship).  See generally Clarence H. Braddock et al., 
Informed Decision Making in Outpatient Practice: Time to Get Back to Basics, 282 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 
2313 (1999) (considering patient autonomy in the context of informed medical decision making). 
199 Cf. Wells, supra note 187, at 179–86 (discussing categories of speech which are accorded 
lesser protection under the First Amendment). 
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whether to break the law.  At this point, however, it is not necessary to 
answer this question.  Instead, it is enough for now to recognize that one’s 
freedom to think as one wishes, even if those thoughts are detestable, 
antisocial, and potentially harmful,200 is a normative guidepost in 
suggesting that the State generally should allow an individual to decide 
whether to break the law absent some strong countervailing interest. 
2.  Protecting the Interest in Deciding Whether to Break the Law 
The three prior claims about the scope of the interest in deciding 
whether to break the law suggest three limitations on the perfect preventive 
state.  First, the State should not attempt to make criminal conduct 
impossible by directly interfering with an individual’s capacity to decide 
whether to break the law.  Second, the State should not selectively prevent 
people from engaging in otherwise lawful conduct because of their intent 
to break the law.  Third, the State should be at least somewhat transparent 
when it implements perfect preventive measures in order to permit citizens 
to maximize their deliberative autonomy if they decide whether to break 
the law.  These limitations are discussed below. 
a.  Preventing the Desire to Engage in Criminal Conduct 
The most obvious way for the State to prevent criminal conduct would 
be to make it impossible for people to want to engage in the conduct.  This 
could be done directly.  For instance, the State could inject a hypothetical 
pharmaceutical in the water supply to suppress its citizens’ anti-social or 
violent impulses,201 or distribute a pharmaceutical that replaces the high 
from an illegal narcotic with unpleasant physical reactions to prevent 
people from deciding to use the drug.202  Less directly, the State could use 
involuntary aversion therapy to prevent criminal desires.203  Because such 
                                                                                                                          
200 See Walen, supra note 179, at 838–39 (detailing how the intent to commit a criminal act makes 
the commission of that act more likely). 
201 Though no such drug currently exists, its development is possible.  See Erica Beecher-Monas 
& Edgar Garcia-Rill, Genetic Predictions of Future Dangerousness: Is There a Blueprint for 
Violence?, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 301, 321 n.125 (2006) (recognizing the potential for drug 
therapy to suppress abnormal responses and desires in violent offenders). 
202 See Ryan Calo, Future of the Internet Symposium: (Im)Perfect Enforcement, CONCURRING 
OPINIONS (Sept. 7, 2010), http://www.concurringopinions.com (discussing such an effort in the context 
of prohibition).  Though such efforts are the stuff of science fiction, see, e.g., ANTHONY BURGESS, A 
CLOCKWORK ORANGE 100–05 (1962) (telling the story of the narrator who, after committing violent 
crimes, becomes a test subject for a technique in which violent acts become associated with the effects 
of a nausea-inducing drug through a type of aversion therapy), and conspiracy theories, see, e.g., 
CHARLES ELIOT PERKINS, THE TRUTH ABOUT WATER FLUORIDATION 11 (1952) (“[Water fluoridation] 
is a planned experiment in mass medication which is part of the technique of the Communist 
philosophy to implant itself in America through mass control of the people by the State.”), their 
scientific plausibility demands some discussion. 
203 “Aversion therapy” is a form of behavioral therapy that aims to make a patient give up an 
undesirable habit by associating it with an unpleasant stimulus.  See Aversion Therapy, M-W.COM, 
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tactics would either interfere directly with an individual’s ability to choose 
whether to break the law or place a physical price on doing so, they should 
not be permitted.204 
One might argue, however, that involuntary aversion therapy is simply 
a more aggressive version of efforts by the State to establish community 
norms against certain criminal conduct.205  For example, the State 
inculcates law-abiding norms in its citizens by punishing those who break 
the law,206 and governments invest substantial resources in publicity 
campaigns to discourage crimes like drunk driving and child abuse.207  But 
punishment and public information campaigns treat people as responsible 
agents who are capable of being rationally persuaded to give up their 
harmful conduct.208  Involuntary aversion therapy, on the other hand, does 
not appeal to rational decision-making and instead activates a subconscious 
aversion to the decision to engage in harmful conduct.209  Thus, neither 
aversion therapy nor more direct modes of limiting people’s thoughts 
should be permissible tools of the perfect preventive state. 
b.  Selective Screen Based on Mental State 
The perfect preventive state also could screen individuals who seek to 
engage in otherwise lawful conduct and prevent those who harbor an 
undesirable mental state from doing so.  Though not currently available, 
the technology to make the necessary sorts of determinations about the 
                                                                                                                          
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/aversion%20therapy (last visited Jan. 25, 2014) (defining 
“aversion therapy” as “therapy intended to suppress an undesirable habit or behavior . . . by associating 
the habit or behavior with a noxious or punishing stimulus”). 
204 See Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877, 877–78 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that administration of 
“fright drug” in prison “raise[s] serious constitutional questions respecting . . . impermissible tinkering 
with the mental processes”).  The involuntary administration of pharmaceuticals also intrudes on 
fundamental interests that are not the subject of the instant discussion, such as the right to bodily 
integrity.  See Rich, supra note 46, at 818–19 (discussing the wide range of possibly invasive 
prevention techniques). 
205 See Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 662 (1998) 
(describing the role of social norms in regulating behavior). 
206 See Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 597–600 
(1996) (describing the expressive theory of punishment as one based on moral condemnation). 
207 See, e.g., Admin. for Children & Families, National Child Abuse Prevention Month, U.S. 
DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., https://www.childwelfare.gov/preventing/preventionmonth/ (last 
visited Jan. 25, 2014) (providing resources to help abused children and to raise awareness of children’s 
issues); R. Gil Kerlikowske, National Impaired Driving Prevention Month, OFF. NAT’L DRUG 
CONTROL POL’Y (Dec. 1, 2012, 1:00 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/12/01/national-
impaired-driving-prevention-month (discussing government efforts to reduce impaired driving). 
208 See, e.g., Sherry F. Colb, Oil and Water: Why Retribution and Repentance Do Not Mix, 22 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 59, 65 (2003) (discussing the treatment of sexual predators in terms of taking 
responsibility for their actions).  
209 See id. at 78 (noting that the “experience of aversion therapy bypasses the conscious, 
intellectual, and autonomous being”). 
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contents of an individual’s mind might someday exist.210  Such technology 
would allow the State to narrowly target conduct already defined as 
unlawful.  For instance, the possession of pseudoephedrine—a common 
ingredient in cold medications—is legal, but many jurisdictions outlaw 
possessing it with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine.211  The 
perfect preventive state could screen those who seek to purchase over-the-
counter medication containing pseudoephedrine and prevent those who 
intend to use it to produce methamphetamine from buying the medicine. 
In addition to enabling perfect prevention of previously-defined 
criminal conduct, technology that could effectively ascertain an 
individual’s mental state or intentions would allow for the loosening of 
some legal restrictions and the more careful tailoring of others.  For 
instance, the Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994212 criminalizes the possession 
of firearms in school zones on the stated ground that their possession gives 
rise to violence and threatens the quality of education.213  Were it possible 
to distinguish with sufficient certainty those who intend to commit 
violence from those who do not, the current ban on gun possession in 
school zones could be amended to permit those who do not harbor a 
violent intent to maintain possession of their weapons.214  This sort of 
tailoring would allow those who do not harbor criminal plans to enjoy a 
more robust Second Amendment freedom, while continuing to prevent the 
dangerous criminal conduct that led to the passage of the Act in the first 
place. 
Such screening is problematic, however, because it conditions an 
individual’s ability to engage in otherwise legal conduct on the contents of 
                                                                                                                          
210 Much has been written about the potential of neuroimaging to provide insight into the mental 
state of a party to a dispute.  See, e.g., Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy, Through a Scanner Darkly: 
Functional Neuroimaging as Evidence of a Criminal Defendant’s Past Mental States, 62 STAN. L. REV. 
1119, 1125 (2010) (arguing that in view of the current state of neuroimaging science, such evidence 
should not be admitted in criminal trials); Jean Macchiaroli Eggen & Eric J. Laury, Toward a 
Neuroscience Model of Tort Law: How Functional Neuroimaging Will Transform Tort Doctrine, 13 
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 235, 237–38 (2012) (offering an optimistic view of the utility of 
neuroimaging as evidence in tort cases).  Though there are many obstacles to the accuracy of 
neuroimaging, the proposed use to identify an individual’s current, rather than past, mental state would 
eliminate at least some of those roadblocks.  See Brown & Murphy, supra, at 1187–88 (arguing that 
neuroimaging evidence is of limited probative value to prove past mental states because all it can do is 
measure a brain’s present reactions to stimuli).  Regardless, my goal is not to attempt to predict how 
technologies of the future might work, but to point out their potential for intruding on legitimate 
individual interests. 
211 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.440 (2007) (criminalizing ephedrine possession with 
intent to manufacture methamphetamine, but allowing possession for other lawful purposes). 
212 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (2012). 
213 Id. § 922(q)(1)(F), (q)(2)(A). 
214 There may be other reasons for forbidding the possession of guns on school grounds, such as 
fear of accidents, which might provide support for maintaining the ban in some form.  The fact 
remains, however, that intent-discerning technology would permit finer tailoring of criminal 
prohibitions. 
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her mind.  In the pseudoephedrine example, anyone could buy cold 
medicine containing pseudoephedrine except for those who have decided 
to use it for a criminal purpose.  Or if we forbid only those who possess a 
firearm with an intent to cause injury from entering schools, one’s ability 
to engage in the hypothetically lawful conduct of entering a school with a 
firearm would be contingent on whether she intends to break the law once 
inside.  In this way, conditioning one’s freedom to engage in otherwise 
lawful conduct on thinking lawful thoughts—or not thinking unlawful 
ones—intrudes on an individual’s legitimate autonomy interest in deciding 
whether to break the law.215 
The State has two options to avoid this intrusion on an individual’s 
freedom of thought.  First, it can prevent all instances of the conduct 
regardless of the content of the actor’s mind.  This is the current approach 
to gun possession in school zones: it is forbidden by law and, if technology 
permitted, it could be made practically impossible.  Second, the State can 
allow all instances of the otherwise lawful conduct and punish those who 
engage in that conduct with the improper mental state.  The State takes this 
approach with respect to the possession of pseudoephedrine and many 
other acts in preparation of crimes.216 
Yet there is something seemingly incongruous in saying that the State 
may punish otherwise lawful conduct engaged in with an improper mental 
state but cannot preemptively prevent the same combination of conduct 
and mental state.  To put it more concretely, if the State can punish 
someone who possesses pseudoephedrine with the intent to manufacture 
methamphetamine, why should the State not be allowed to prevent that 
person from obtaining the pseudoephedrine in the first place if it can 
determine in advance that she has the same intent?  This inconsistency 
does not arise merely with respect to the limited class of crimes defined as 
the commission of an otherwise lawful act with some nefarious intent.  For 
example, the criminal law punishes incomplete attempts—such as when an 
actor intends to commit a crime and takes a substantial step beyond mere 
preparation in furtherance of that intent, but is prevented from bringing her 
criminal plan to fruition.217  These steps need not be, and often are not, 
                                                                                                                          
215 See supra note 197 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that the Constitution protects 
individual rights even when a citizen does not wish to act on those rights). 
216 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (forbidding the transportation of another person in interstate or 
foreign commerce “with intent that such individual engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for 
which any person can be charged with a criminal offense”). 
217 DRESSLER, supra note 181, at 374–75.  The criminalization of incomplete attempts is arguably 
part of the preventive state in that it allows law enforcement to intervene to prevent more serious 
harms.  See Stephen J. Morse, Reason, Results, and Criminal Responsibility, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 
387 (“[S]ufficiently threatening behavior may allow law enforcement to intervene early . . . , [or] 
provide . . . justification for preventative civil commitment.”). 
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criminal standing alone.218  But if the State could technologically identify 
individuals who possess a criminal intent, why should it not be allowed to 
prevent those individuals from taking substantial, non-criminal steps in 
furtherance of that intent? 
One could resolve this conundrum by concluding that incomplete 
attempts and otherwise-lawful acts with specific criminal intents should 
not be criminalized, either because the punished acts are not culpable or 
because punishing them impermissibly punishes thoughts.219  In either 
case, the inconsistency disappears because both the punitive and perfect 
preventive states are now subject to the same limitation: the State can 
neither punish nor make practically impossible otherwise lawful conduct 
based on the contents of the actor’s mind.  However normatively or 
analytically tempting this resolution may be, it is descriptively inaccurate, 
because jurisdictions do punish incomplete attempts.   
The inconsistency also can be resolved by recognizing that punishment 
is different from perfect prevention in a way that justifies the former’s use 
even where the latter is inappropriate.  Before an actor can be punished for 
an incomplete attempt, a factfinder must find that she had a criminal intent 
and completed a sufficiently culpable act in furtherance of that intent.220  
The former question is a normative one, at least in part, as the factfinder 
must decide if the actor’s intent was sufficiently firm and not too 
contingent on future events to give rise to criminal culpability.221  The 
                                                                                                                          
218 A classic incomplete attempt hypothetical involves a person lying in wait to kill another and 
then changing her mind or being arrested.  See Alexander & Ferzan, supra note 61, at 642 (“[W]hen 
Frankie lies in wait for Johnny to return . . . , at which time she intends to kill him [she has] committed 
an incomplete attempt at murder.”).  Lying in wait, of course, is not a criminal act, as the popularity of 
surprise birthday parties establishes.  Though precisely the point at which an individual can be found 
guilty of attempt for coming close to realizing her intent to commit a future crime varies from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and in some cases from crime to crime; most jurisdictions employ the 
Model Penal Code’s broad definition of the actus reus of attempt as “a substantial step in a course of 
conduct planned to culminate in . . . commission of the crime.”  MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1) (1985); 
see John Hasnas, Attempt, Preparation, and Harm: The Case of the Jealous Ex-Husband, 9 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 761, 762 (2012) (“[G]oing to a potential victim’s home with a loaded firearm and lurking in 
the bushes outside a window . . . is clearly a substantial step toward the crime of attempted murder.”). 
219 See Alexander & Ferzan, supra note 61, at 643 (arguing that incomplete attempts are not 
culpable acts); Morse, supra note 217, at 389 (finding it “plausible” that “punishment for incomplete 
attempts is punishment for thoughts rather than for culpable actions”).   
220 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(2) (describing conduct that may constitute a substantial 
step). 
221 See ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 4, at 203–06 (discussing the conditional nature of 
intents in the context of attempt liability); D. Michael Risinger, Unsafe Verdicts: The Need for 
Reformed Standards for the Trial and Review of Factual Innocence Claims, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1281, 
1294–95 (2004) (arguing that even the most “ordinary” inquiries into a defendant’s mental state 
“depend so much on minor variations in detail,” and they thus require the jury to operate “in a 
contextually rich environment”); see also Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1999) 
(holding that some, but not all, conditional intents would be sufficient for guilt under a federal 
carjacking statute). 
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latter inquiry also can be broken into two pieces: a factual assessment of 
the individual’s action and a normative judgment about whether those acts 
are sufficiently wrongful to deserve criminal punishment.  For instance, the 
factfinder must evaluate the seriousness of the intended crime, how close 
the actor was to its completion, how certain the crime was to occur, and 
how much the actor already has done in order to decide whether her 
(possibly) non-criminal conduct subjects her to liability for a criminal 
attempt.222  These normative judgments by the factfinder are uniquely 
necessary in the context of criminal attempts because, unlike in the typical 
case where the legislature has defined the harmful, forbidden conduct with 
some specificity, the act required for an attempt is intentionally vague.223  
Thus, when faced with two actors who are charged with the same attempt 
offense based on the same specific otherwise lawful act, two juries may 
rightly find one guilty and another not guilty because of the small 
variations in the surrounding circumstances.224  While the punitive state 
permits, and indeed requires, this individualized normative inquiry, perfect 
prevention does not.  Without that fact-specific judgment, the State 
therefore intrudes on an individual’s legitimate autonomy interest in 
deciding whether to break the law when it conditions the individual’s 
freedom to engage in otherwise lawful conduct on the contents of her 
mind.   
Two further observations are in order.  First, this limitation on the use 
of screening in perfect prevention applies only to incomplete attempts and 
to the relatively narrow subset of crimes that forbid the combination of 
otherwise lawful conduct and the intent to engage in future criminal 
conduct.  Instead, most crimes that involve some future intent requirement 
use that future intent to distinguish a more serious crime from a less 
serious one.225  In these cases, if it were possible to make the underlying 
criminal conduct practically impossible, the State would presumably do so 
regardless of whether those engaging in that conduct have the aggravating 
intent to engage in some future criminal act.  And even if the State were to 
condition an individual’s ability to engage in the underlying criminal 
conduct on the absence of the aggravating future intent, this would not 
                                                                                                                          
222 Audrey Rogers, New Technology, Old Defenses: Internet Sting Operations and Attempt 
Liability, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 477, 490–92 (2004). 
223 See Michael T. Cahill, Attempt, Reckless Homicide, and the Design of Criminal Law, 78 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 879, 909 (2007) (noting the various formulations of the act required for attempt liability 
to attach). 
224 See Risinger, supra note 221, at 1295 & n.66 (discussing how small variations in a case can 
change a jury’s understanding of a factual circumstance).  
225 For instance, criminal codes frequently punish the possession of an illegal drug with the intent 
to sell to a greater extent than mere possession.  See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-95(b)(1), (d)(1) (2011) 
(providing different punishments for the possession of controlled substances and possession with the 
intent to sell, deliver, or manufacture). 
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intrude on any legitimate liberty interest of the individual. 
Second, the limitation described in this Section is not necessarily 
absolute.  The State can intrude on fundamental individual liberties when 
its interests are sufficiently compelling and the intrusion is narrowly 
tailored to serve those interests.226  So too might the State be justified in 
screening people under certain circumstances and selectively restricting 
their liberty to engage in otherwise lawful conduct based on their mental 
state.  Fleshing out when such circumstances might exist is beyond the 
scope of this Article, but certain factors would likely be relevant: the 
severity of the harm threatened; the frequency with which the targeted 
conduct leads to the threatened harm; and whether the targeted conduct is 
subject independently to constitutional protection.227 
c.  Transparency 
In order to meaningfully exercise her autonomy interest in deciding 
whether to break the law, an individual must have access to as much 
information as possible that is legitimately relevant to that decision.228  The 
constitutional fair warning doctrine provides useful guidance in 
ascertaining what information is legitimately relevant to this decision.  It 
teaches that the law must inform potential criminals as clearly as possible 
both what the law forbids and the potential punishment for breaking the 
law.229  This doctrine is primarily justified on the ground that punishment 
without notice is unfair and unjust.230  Fair warning also ensures that 
potential criminals have enough information to craft their conduct in a way 
that avoids the law’s prohibitions, if they wish.231  The hope, of course, is 
that the potential criminal will choose not to violate the law, but fair 
warning also provides the criminal who is committed to breaking the law 
with an opportunity to make an informed decision to do so. 
                                                                                                                          
226 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (applying the “strict 
scrutiny” standard for laws that burden protected speech). 
227 See Ferzan, supra note 3, at 155–57 (discussing the factors that might be considered in 
assessing the risk factors of an individual under a selective prevention scheme). 
228 See supra note 198 and accompanying text (discussing autonomy in informed decision making 
in various contests). 
229 See United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954) (“[N]o man shall be held criminally 
responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.”); Jordan v. De 
George, 341 U.S. 223, 230 (1951) (“The essential purpose of the ‘void for vagueness’ doctrine is to 
warn individuals of the criminal consequences of their conduct.”); McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 
25, 27 (1931) (“[I]t is reasonable that a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the 
common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed.”). 
230 See Trevor W. Morrison, Fair Warning and the Retroactive Judicial Expansion of Federal 
Criminal Statutes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 455, 461–62 (2001) (examining the fair warning principle and 
describing ex post facto laws as being unjust). 
231 See id. at 463 (“[T]he Ex Post Facto Clause imposes a requirement of notice consistent with 
the principle of legality: It requires that a legislature give advance notice of its intent to treat conduct as 
criminal so that individuals may ensure that their actions conform to the law.”). 
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Similarly, when the State prevents people from engaging in certain 
conduct on the grounds that it is criminal, citizens are entitled to know 
what conduct the State aims to prevent.  With this information, they can 
meaningfully decide whether to abandon their desired criminal ends, to 
seek to achieve them in a way that is not frustrated by perfect prevention, 
or to overcome the State’s efforts at prevention.  Imagine, for instance, that 
State A wants to prevent people from engaging in the criminal conduct of 
viewing child pornography online and thus mandates that ISPs block 
access to websites known to host child pornography in order to prevent its 
citizens from engaging in the crime of possessing child pornography.232  In 
implementing its mandate, State A can choose to be transparent—requiring 
an ISP to inform the user that a site was blocked because it contains child 
pornography, that viewing such material is a crime, and that the State 
ordered the ISP to block the site233—or it can choose to be obscure—
requiring that the ISP display an innocuous error message that conceals all 
of this information.234  In light of the harm and moral outrage caused by the 
production and viewing of child pornography, most citizens of State A 
might be perfectly happy that the State prevents people from viewing child 
pornography on the Internet, transparently or not.235 
The choice between transparency and obscurity matters, however.  
Imagine that Sam, a resident of State A, wants to view child pornography.  
If State A chooses to prevent him from doing so obscurely, Sam may not 
know that he is being prevented from doing something, what he is being 
prevented from doing, why he is prevented from doing it, or who is 
responsible for the obstacles to his Internet access.  Without any of this 
                                                                                                                          
232 The United Kingdom, Canada, and Finland take a version of this approach to preventing the 
viewing of child pornography.  See Federica Casarosa, Protection of Minors Online: Available 
Regulatory Approaches, 14 J. INTERNET L. 25, 31 (2011) (describing the Internet Watch Foundation’s 
system for reporting sites with illegal content to ISPs to facilitate blocking or disabling access); 
Nunziato, supra note 99, at 1136–38 (describing the Cleanfeed system adopted in the United Kingdom 
to block blacklisted websites, as well as similar models in Canada and Finland). 
233 For example, in the United Kingdom, the Internet Watch Foundation suggests that it is “good 
practice” for ISPs to post the following statement when they block a page that is believed to contained 
child pornography: “Access has been denied by your internet access provider because this page may 
contain indecent images of children as identified by the Internet Watch Foundation.  If you think this 
page has been blocked in error please contact <your service provider>.”  Blocking Good Practice, 
INTERNET WATCH FOUND., http://www.iwf.org.uk/members/member-policies/url-list/blocking-good-
practice (last visited Jan. 25, 2014). 
234 The Chinese government takes this approach when it prevents access to undesirable foreign 
websites.  JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?  ILLUSIONS OF A 
BORDERLESS WORLD 94 (2006). 
235 Of course, there are other issues that would likely arise in the context of such a government 
mandate.  Most notably, the censorship model almost certainly would intrude on the First Amendment 
interests of both the publisher of the targeted websites and those seeking to view them.  See Broder 
Kleinschmidt, An International Comparison of ISP’s Liabilities for Unlawful Third Party Content, 18 
INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 332, 341–42 (2010) (discussing challenges to similar regimes in the United 
States). 
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information, he may become frustrated and give up, satisfy his interest 
elsewhere, or bypass the perfect preventive scheme by happenstance.  But 
regardless of what happens, State A has failed to respect his autonomy and, 
given Sam’s ignorance, it is not accurate to say that he has made a fully 
autonomous choice to break the law or to obey it.236  Indeed, even if he 
discovers some of the information that the State has hidden, Sam’s 
autonomy will remain effectively ignorant.  Maybe he will realize that he 
is being prevented from accessing some portion of the Internet, but 
nonetheless conclude that his particular ISP is seeking to prevent access to 
all obscene material, lawful or not.  Or maybe he will perceive the State’s 
hand, but not recognize that the State is trying to keep him from 
committing a crime.  Thus, even if it reveals some of this information, the 
State will undermine Sam’s autonomy.237   
But if the State transparently reveals to Sam that it is responsible for 
the limitations on his web browsing and that those limitations exist because 
the targeted websites contain child pornography, then Sam would be able 
to exercise his autonomy fully in deciding how he will proceed.  
Specifically, Sam could accept the blocking as justified and forego his 
interest, or seek to circumvent or overcome the perfect preventive 
technology in some way.  We would hope Sam would choose the first 
option, of course, and if he does then we can say that the choice was truly 
his own.  Likewise, if Sam chooses the second option and ultimately 
violates the law, the State can punish him, knowing again that the choice 
was his and that he is fully deserving of punishment. 
This transparency and respect for Sam’s autonomy may come at some 
cost.  If the State obscures its involvement in preventing criminal conduct 
and its goals in doing so, the determined criminal must spend some 
resources ascertaining those facts before she can begin to circumvent the 
State’s efforts.  But when the State is transparent, the determined criminal 
can seek to achieve his goal more efficiently.  Moreover, reactance theory 
teaches that perceived restrictions on an activity increase the desirability of 
engaging in that activity.238  Thus Sam, knowing that the State has limited 
his access to child pornography, may seek more actively to view it.  
Intentional law-breaking is always a risk of permitting individual 
                                                                                                                          
236 Cf. Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Notice-and-Comment Sentencing, 97 MINN. L. 
REV. 1, 9–10 (2012) (recognizing that the “knowing” requirement for a valid waiver of trial rights is 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s focus on individual autonomy in plea bargaining). 
237 Of course, it is possible that a particularly enterprising individual will be able to figure out all 
these legitimately relevant facts even if the State seeks to obscure them.  Even then, the most that can 
be said is that the individual will get to decide autonomously whether to break the law.  It would still be 
inaccurate, however, to say that the State has respected that individual’s autonomy. 
238 See Joel D. Lieberman & Jamie Arndt, Understanding the Limits of Limiting Instructions, 6 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 677, 693 (2000) (“[W]hen free behaviors are threatened, the attractiveness 
of the threatened behavior increases.”). 
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autonomy, however, and the State can punish Sam if he is successful, with 
confidence that he is a culpable and dangerous criminal. 
Though facts like the State’s role in perfect prevention and the nature 
of the conduct the State seeks to prevent are legitimately relevant to an 
individual’s decision of whether to break the law, the mechanics of how 
the State aims to make criminal conduct practically impossible are not.  In 
the realm of traditional crime fighting, the State is not required to publicize 
its specific strategies and tactics.  Police can actively conceal their attempts 
to ferret out crime by going undercover239 and are permitted to lie to 
suspects in an effort to obtain incriminating information.240  The techniques 
and procedures of law enforcement investigations are also exempt from 
Freedom of Information Act requests.241  This secrecy is justifiable on a 
number of grounds, including officer safety and a desire not to undermine 
law enforcement effectiveness.242  Such secrecy also makes sense here 
because revealing law enforcement techniques to potential criminals does 
not advance any legitimate autonomy interest.  Certainly, knowledge about 
specific police strategies would be relevant to a potential criminal’s 
decision about whether to break the law because the knowledge would 
allow her to accurately assess, and possibly seek to diminish, her risk of 
apprehension.  But just as the potential criminal does not have a legitimate 
interest in breaking the law, she has no legitimate interest in minimizing 
the likelihood of apprehension and punishment if she does.  Similarly, the 
potential criminal does not have a legitimate interest in accurately 
assessing the risk of apprehension and punishment; rather, the State has a 
valid interest in maximizing deterrence by inflating the perception of that 
risk. 
In the perfect prevention context, this means that information detailing 
the specifics of how a perfect preventive technology works is not 
legitimately relevant to an individual’s decision of whether to conform to 
the law.  Recall Sam once more.  If he knows that State A is preventing 
him from accessing websites that contain child pornography, he can decide 
to forego his desire to engage in criminal conduct or seek to circumvent or 
overcome the perfect preventive technology in violation of the law.  Sam 
has a legitimate interest in making this decision as a responsible citizen of 
State A, but if he tries to break the law, he has no legitimate interest in 
succeeding.  Information about how State A is preventing him from 
                                                                                                                          
239 See Nita A. Farahany, Searching Secrets, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1239, 1300 n.318 (2012) 
(collecting cases where federal courts have approved of recording conversations between suspects and 
undercover agents and informants). 
240 See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 737–39 (1969) (upholding the admission of a confession 
that was made during an interrogation in which police lied about strength of their case). 
241 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E) (2012). 
242 Id. 
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accessing websites containing child pornography is relevant to Sam’s 
decision about whether to break the law only in that it might allow him to 
circumvent the perfect preventive technology more efficiently or 
effectively.  Thus, extending the transparency of perfect prevention to the 
mechanics of the perfect preventive technology does not advance 
legitimate autonomy interests. 
B.  The Problem of Equality 
One virtue of structural approaches to the regulation of private conduct 
is that they apply equally to all affected people.243  In that vein, by 
targeting criminal conduct rather than specific people, perfect prevention 
does not allow the State to discriminate on improper bases such as race, 
religion, or political animosity.244  Perfect prevention in turn might restore 
some of the trust that marginalized communities have lost in the State and 
address broader societal concerns about inequality in the criminal justice 
system.245 
The equality of perfect prevention also has a downside, however, in 
that it treats every person like a potential criminal.246  Specifically, by 
preventing all people equally from engaging in the targeted criminal 
conduct, the perfect preventive state effectively assumes that everyone has 
the same baseline capacity, inclination, and tendency to engage in that 
conduct sufficient to justify an intrusion on their liberty.  This assumption 
is problematic for at least three reasons.  First, it is almost certainly not 
true.  From a purely statistical standpoint, crimes are often committed more 
frequently by certain classes of people and less frequently by others.  For 
instance, young males commit far more violent crime than older females.247  
Meanwhile, middle-aged white males with less education are more likely 
                                                                                                                          
243 See Cheng, supra note 50, at 665 (noting that structure “tends to produce higher compliance 
rates, because its regulatory power is immediate and uniformly imposed on most members of the 
population without the need for further police intervention”).  
244 See Rich, supra note 46, at 807 (noting the possibility that prosecutorial “choices can be 
infected by improper considerations that give rise to constitutional concerns”).  
245 Id.  
246 See Keith Hayward, Situational Crime Prevention and its Discontents: Rational Choice 
Theory Versus the “Culture of Now,” 41 SOC. POL’Y & ADMIN. 232, 243 (2007) (“Today, in contrast, 
contemporary [situational crime prevention] theorists proceed from the standpoint that ‘we are all 
criminals now’—almost as if criminality was a shared or universal social norm.”). 
247 Compare Crime in the United States 2011: Table 39, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.-2011/tables/table-39 (last visited Jan. 25, 2014) 
(placing the number of 2011 violent crime arrests among males who were age eighteen and under at 
42,822), with Crime in the United States 2011: Table 40, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.-2011/tables/table-40 (last visited Jan. 25, 2014) 
(placing the number of 2011 violent crime arrests among females who were age eighteen and under at 
9542). 
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to commit multiple drunk-driving offenses.248  Moreover, if some people 
are predisposed to flout the law, others are presumably predisposed to 
abide by it scrupulously. 
Second, treating everyone like a potential criminal communicates to 
each person specifically and to the citizenry generally that their 
government does not trust them.249  Such a lack of trust is insulting because 
it suggests that the government does not respect the moral fiber of its 
citizens and their ability to forego criminal conduct.250  With respect to 
certain minor offenses that are committed by broad swathes of the 
population, like jaywalking or speeding, this lack of trust may in fact be 
justified.  But the expression of distrust of its citizens by the government 
has the potential of undermining the legitimacy of our representational 
system.251 
Third, the equality of perfect prevention runs contrary to the liberal 
presumption that a citizen is law-abiding absent individualized evidence to 
the contrary.252  Thus, the State must provide individualized proof of guilt 
to punish253 and the nature and duration of punishment are determined 
based somewhat on the individual circumstances of the crime and the 
criminal.254  Similarly, the State may use the tools of the preventive state 
only after putting forth individualized proof of dangerousness and 
irresponsibility.255  Individualized treatment in the allocation of 
punishment and the imposition of prevention respects the humanity and 
                                                                                                                          
248 Matthew DeMichele & Nathan C. Lowe, DWI Recidivism: Risk Implications for Community 
Supervision, 75 FED. PROBATION 19, 21 (2011). 
249 See R.A. Duff & S.E. Marshall, Benefits, Burdens and Responsibilities: Some Ethical 
Dimensions of Situational Crime Prevention, in ETHICAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON SITUATIONAL 
CRIME PREVENTION, supra note 155, at 17, 21–22 (“[Situational Crime Prevention] measures typically 
manifest a lack or loss of trust: they are (seen as) necessary because we do not trust people not to 
commit the crimes that they aim to prevent.”). 
250 Id. at 22. 
251 See Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between 
Government and Citizen, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1777–81 (1994) (discussing the role of reciprocal 
trust in the legitimacy of a republican government). 
252 See Alec Walen, A Punitive Precondition for Preventive Detention: Lost Status as a 
Foundation for a Lost Immunity, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1229, 1230–31 (2011) (noting that “[a] state 
must normally accord its autonomous and accountable citizens” the presumption that they are law-
abiding “as a matter of basic respect for their autonomous moral agency”). 
253 See Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 524 
(2012) (“[T]here is no substitute for an individual determination of guilt before a deprivation of 
liberty.”). 
254 See Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 264 (2009) (per curiam) (recognizing that judges 
can depart from federal sentencing guideline range “based on an individualized determination that they 
yield an excessive sentence in a particular case”). 
255 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357–58 (1997) (holding that a Kansas civil 
commitment statute was “consistent with the requirements of . . . other statutes that [the Court has] 
upheld in that it narrows the class of persons eligible for confinement to those who are unable to 
control their dangerousness”).   
 926 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:883 
dignity of the person subject to the State’s power.256  Perfect prevention, on 
the other hand, does not require, and indeed does not allow for, such 
individualized findings, and it operates from the unsubstantiated 
assumption that all citizens are equally predisposed to break the law.  
By treating everyone like a potential criminal, perfect prevention 
upsets the relationship between the State and its citizens and threatens our 
deliberative democracy.  Just like the parent who makes a tempting but 
dangerous toy disappear during a child’s naptime, the State removes the 
option of engaging in a dangerous or undesirable activity.257  
Surreptitiously removing dangerous temptation makes sense in the parental 
context: it ensures that the parent can fulfill her duty to protect her child, 
avoids the complications of dealing with the child’s anger over losing the 
toy, and abrogates any need to explain the decision.  But with the 
exception of those unable to care for themselves, the State does not act as a 
parent to its citizens.258  Thus, while a parent may relish the opportunity to 
avoid a child’s tantrums, the State does not have that luxury. 
Rather, for the State’s authority of its people to be legitimate, public 
officials must be accountable for their decisions.259  Deliberative 
democracy theory in turn teaches that government accountability requires 
that citizens be able to demand explanations from their public officials, and 
the decisions of those officials are legitimate only to the extent that these 
officials can provide acceptable explanations.260  Citizens can then cast 
their votes on the basis of the explanations given by public officials.261  Of 
course, for citizens to be able to demand explanations from the State, they 
must know what their government does, and thus the State must act 
                                                                                                                          
256 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (“Consideration of both the 
offender and the offense in order to arrive at a just and appropriate sentence has been viewed as a 
progressive and humanizing development.”). 
257 See Tien, supra note 86, at 6–7 (“Consider the following situation: in a drug-infested 
neighborhood, dealers use public coin telephones so that their calls cannot be traced to their home 
phones.  The coin phones are then removed to stop such calls.  Such regulation is not fully captured by 
the model of sanction-backed or duty-declaring rules.  Neither  sanctions nor duties are imposed upon 
the drug dealers by such action.  They remain ‘free’ to act, but their conditions of action have been 
changed through the elimination of a resource (phones) with a design feature that facilitated drug 
dealing (untraceability).”). 
258 See Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 
57–58 (1890) (recognizing the State’s parens patriae authority “for the prevention of injury to those 
who cannot protect themselves”). 
259 See Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253, 1254 (2009) 
(“[V]oters must be able to hold public officials accountable for their specific policy choices to ensure 
that those decisions are consistent with the preferences of a majority.”). 
260 Id. at 1254–55. 
261 See John J. Worley, Deliberative Constitutionalism, 2009 BYU L. REV. 431, 442–44 (“[T]he 
hallmark of deliberative democracy is that it requires voters to deliberate about how they should vote 
on the basis of their impartial judgments as to what best conduces to the common good rather than on 
the basis of what best advances their own individual or group interests.”). 
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transparently.262  Yet, perfect prevention often can operate opaquely,263 
undermining deliberative democracy, government accountability, and 
ultimately the legitimacy of State action.264 
In a similar vein, perfect prevention can interfere with civil 
disobedience.  By making criminal conduct practically impossible, perfect 
prevention eliminates the most obvious avenue of protesting of an unjust 
law—engaging in the outlawed conduct.  It opens the door for another, 
however: those who object to the criminalization of the conduct targeted 
by perfect prevention or the use of perfect prevention in a given context 
may protest by publicly seeking to circumvent the technology.  For 
instance, when a court in the United Kingdom ordered ISPs to block access 
to The Pirate Bay website on the ground that it provided movies, music, 
and other content for download in violation of copyright law, methods to 
circumvent the block appeared within minutes.265  Some of those who 
provided the workarounds defended them as a protest against a court order 
they perceived to be unjust.266  But again, either kind of civil disobedience 
relies on perfect prevention being transparent.  If citizens are not aware that 
a restriction has been implemented by the government and that its purpose 
is to prevent certain criminal conduct, they will not know enough to 
recognize that civil disobedience may provide a useful mode of protest.  
Moreover, perfect prevention undermines the value of less intentional, 
but perhaps more fundamental, interactions between the public and 
government regulation, and specifically what Julie Cohen calls the “Play of 
Everyday Practice.”267  Unlike civil disobedience or political engagement, 
the play of everyday practice originates “in ad hoc, tactical responses to 
institutional structures and cultural patterns.”268  It involves an informal 
                                                                                                                          
262 See Staszewski, supra note 259, at 1281 (“If citizens are unaware that a particular government 
official has made a specific policy decision, they cannot possibly hold that official accountable in any 
meaningful way for this action.  A requirement or expectation that the public official will provide a 
reasoned explanation for the decision enables interested citizens and other public officials to evaluate, 
discuss, and criticize the action, as well as potentially to seek political or legal reform.”); see also 
David S. Levine, The People’s Trade Secrets?, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 61, 104 (2011) 
(“[D]eliberative democracy requires transparency in order for it to be operative; without transparency, 
deliberative democracy cannot exist.”). 
263 See supra notes 86–89 and accompanying text. 
264 See Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 895–99 (2006) 
(outlining the arguments for transparency as being fundamental to democratic government). 
265 Zack Whittaker, U.K.’s Largest ISP Blocks the Pirate Bay, but to No Avail, CNET (June 20, 
2012), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57457001-93/u.k.s-largest-isp-blocks-the-pirate-bay-but-to-
no-avail/. 
266 See Ben Woods, Pirate Bay: Protest Ban with Local MPs, ZDNET (May 1, 2012), 
http://www.zdnet.com/pirate-bay-protest-ban-with-local-mps-4010026052/ (“[The Pirate Bay] has 
urged its users to write to their local MPs and ISPs to protest the ban as it represents a form of 
censorship that could have far reaching consequences in future cases.”). 
267 See COHEN, supra note 51, at 50–57 (describing the play of everyday practice). 
268 Id. at 55. 
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pushing against and working within the structural constraints imposed by 
technological capabilities, cultural rules, and government regulation.269  
The play of everyday practice is “shaped from the outset by institutional 
and material constraints,” “takes what it can get,” and “can provoke 
reexamination of the law.”270  From a practical standpoint, the play of 
everyday practice is central to moral and intellectual development and can 
lead to transformative creativity and innovation in response to 
constraints.271  For instance, Cohen cites the example of people who, in 
response to widespread video surveillance in New York City, engaged in 
creative, transgressive performances on camera or developed Internet-
based applications to allow people to avoid being watched.272  The play of 
everyday practice might also include innovation that occurs through 
tolerated, illegal conduct.273  In the copyright realm, for example, the 
notice-and-takedown provisions of the DMCA have allowed copyright 
owners to tolerate certain infringing uses of copyrighted material, which in 
turn has led to innovative business models for copyright owners to profit 
from their content.274 
Cohen identifies a number of requirements for the play of everyday 
practice, two of which are most obviously threatened by perfect 
prevention: operational transparency and semantic discontinuity.275  
Operational transparency “means that people must know how they are 
situated in code and technologies, what is being done to them, how code 
and technology limit their actions and choices, and why.”276  Operational 
transparency is necessary because it allows people to “exercise meaningful 
control over their surroundings” in the same way that one needs to know 
the basic laws of science to manipulate the physical world.277  Semantic 
discontinuity involves gaps and imperfections in systems of control and 
surveillance.278  These gaps and imperfections are necessary because they 
are, in some sense, the playground—the (theoretical) space in which the 
play of everyday practice occurs. 
The requirement of operational transparency reinforces the importance 
of broad transparency in the operation of the perfect preventive state.  Yet 
                                                                                                                          
269 See id. (discussing the inherent difficulties in characterizing play). 
270 Id. at 50, 55. 
271 See id. at 54, 227 (stating that some individuals “engage in more transgressive performances, 
‘acting out’ for the cameras,” while others “help people plot circuitous routes around them”). 
272 Id. at 52. 
273 See Tim Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 617, 618–20 (2008) (discussing the 
frequency of tolerated copyright violations). 
274 ZITTRAIN, supra note 1, at 119–21. 
275 COHEN, supra note 51, at 223–24. 
276 Balkin, supra note 59, at 103. 
277 COHEN, supra note 51, at 235. 
278 Balkin, supra note 59, at 103; see COHEN, supra note 51, at 239–41 (describing semantic 
discontinuity as “the opposite of seamlessness”). 
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the fact that perfect prevention targets conduct that has been legislatively 
defined as criminal complicates matters.  The play of everyday practice 
would best flourish if perfect prevention were transparent not only in what 
it seeks to prevent and the State’s role in doing so, but also in how it seeks 
to prevent criminal conduct.279  This pits the play of everyday practice 
against the State’s interest in crime-fighting, which is best advanced by 
limiting public access to information about law enforcement strategies.280  
Similarly, the need for semantic discontinuity would suggest that the State 
should build imperfections into perfect prevention that allow for innovative 
play in the gaps.281  Once again, however, such efforts would likely be 
resisted by those who view crime prevention and societal protection as the 
State’s most important responsibilities.282 
One way to avoid the potentially intractable political tension that 
results when one starts talking about efforts that undermine crime 
prevention is to focus instead on ensuring that the legislature’s power to 
criminalize conduct is not overused.  Scholars frequently bemoan the 
proliferation of criminal statutes, noting, inter alia, that they vest too much 
unchecked discretion in state actors.283  That discretion has ample 
downsides, but one upside is that it can ensure that overbroad criminal 
statutes are not used to prosecute conduct that society did not mean to 
forbid.284  When a criminal statute is used, however, as the foundation for 
perfect preventive technology, that discretion disappears and all instances 
of the targeted conduct are potentially eliminated.  Moreover, once conduct 
is described as criminal, it becomes difficult to argue that the government 
should forego any opportunity to prevent it.  This is less troubling for 
                                                                                                                          
279 See COHEN, supra note 51, at 236–37 (noting the importance of “technological due process” 
which would require “the public provision of meaningful information about the ways that traditionally 
public functions are performed”). 
280 See text accompanying notes 238–41 (detailing some of the investigative techniques available 
and the reasons for their secrecy). 
281 See COHEN, supra note 51, at 264 (arguing that the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions 
should apply only to technologies that protect copyrighted materials while “incorporate[ing] more 
tolerance for play”). 
282 See Balkin, supra note 59, at 118 (recognizing the tension between Cohen’s argument for 
semantic discontinuity and treatment of undesirable conduct as a threat to society’s security). 
283 See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress 
Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 749 (2005) (noting that a “common feature[]” of 
overcriminalization is “excessive unchecked discretion in enforcement authorities”). 
284 See Wayne R. LaFave, The Prosecutor’s Discretion in the United States, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 
532, 533 (1970) (suggesting that the criminal codes are overbroad in scope since they criminalize all 
actions of which people disapprove and leave prosecutors to decide what laws are necessary to 
enforce); Erik Luna, Prosecutorial Decriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 785, 816 
(2012) (arguing that prosecutors decriminalize conduct by using “discretionary decision making” in 
deciding what to prosecute). 
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crimes like murder or rape, where the harms are obvious and severe.285  
But where it raises constitutional concerns, as in the unauthorized 
duplication of copyrighted material,286 or is less clearly harmful, as in 
sleeping on a park bench,287 the political momentum in favor of crime 
prevention and the sweeping effect of perfect prevention counsel for more 
judicious use of the criminal law and narrow construction. 
C.  The Ordering of Crime Preventing Measures 
When comparing punishment and prevention, most scholars agree that 
the tools of the preventive state should be used only in those situations 
where punishment cannot effectively prevent crime.288  Such a limitation, 
which finds some support in Supreme Court jurisprudence,289 derives from 
respect that the punitive state pays to individual autonomy.290  Punishment 
respects an actor’s choice.  She can avoid punishment by choosing not to 
offend, but if she decides to offend, the punitive state will punish her only 
in proportion to her chosen wrongdoing.291  Meanwhile, the preventive 
state curtails autonomy by taking that choice out of the actor’s hands 
altogether.292  If this were not bad enough, the tools of the preventive state 
also tend to be overbroad, restricting far more liberty than is necessary to 
                                                                                                                          
285 See ZITTRAIN, supra note 1, at 110 (suggesting that perfect law enforcement for serious crimes 
is appealing). 
286 See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 890 (2012) (recognizing that the Copyright Act has 
“built-in First Amendment accommodations” such as the fair use doctrine which permits exact 
reproduction of copyrighted works in particular circumstances like news reporting, teaching, and 
research so that unauthorized copying is not always punishable (quoting Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 
186, 219 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
287 See Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1575–77 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (discussing 
ordinances that forbid sleeping in public for possible Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional 
violations).   
288 See Cole, supra note 9, at 696 (“[A]ny consideration of preventive detention should begin with 
a strong presumption that society should deal with dangerous people through criminal prosecution and 
punishment, not preventive detention.”); Michael Louis Corrado, Sex Offenders, Unlawful Combatants, 
and Preventive Detention, 84 N.C. L. REV. 77, 85 (2005) (arguing that preventive detention should be 
permitted only for “those who cannot conform to the law, including those not in control of their 
behavior”); Schulhofer, supra note 9, at 85 (proposing that prevention is permissible “only as a gap-
filler, to solve problems that the criminal process cannot address”).   
289 See, e.g., Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412 (2002) (noting the “constitutional importance of 
distinguishing a dangerous sexual offender subject to civil commitment ‘from other dangerous persons 
who are perhaps more properly dealt with exclusively through criminal proceedings’” (quoting Kansas 
v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360 (1997))); see also Schulhofer, supra note 9, at 85–90 (arguing that 
Supreme Court precedents implicitly recognize that the criminal process is preferred over preventive 
measures). 
290 Schulhofer, supra note 9, at 90–91. 
291 Id. 
292 See Morse, supra note 15, at 1122 (“[I]t is a massive infringement on [dangerous agents’] 
liberty and autonomy to institute pure preventive detention for responsible agents.”); Schulhofer, supra 
note 9, at 93 (arguing that in order to not infringe personal autonomy, “the criminal process [must 
serve] as its first line of defense”). 
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prevent crime.293  Thus, where both punishment and prevention might be 
used to prevent crime, punishment is typically viewed as the better 
option,294 though scholars debate precisely when the punitive state can be 
said to be inadequate and when prevention is appropriate.295 
Where, though, does perfect prevention fit into this hierarchy?  
Specifically, how does perfect prevention compare to punishment?  How 
does it compare to prevention?  The initial answer to the first question is 
straightforward: punishment should be preferred over perfect prevention 
for the same autonomy-respecting reason as it is preferred over prevention.  
As noted previously, punishment respects an actor’s autonomy by making 
any loss of liberty contingent on her choice to break the law.296  Like 
prevention, perfect prevention, on the other hand, deprives the actor of that 
choice entirely.297  Consequently, when both options are available for the 
prevention of certain criminal conduct, punishment should be preferred 
over perfect prevention. 
To those who value individual autonomy as a right of the highest 
order, this analysis may be sufficient to require that perfect prevention 
never be used.  But to those who are not absolutists about individual 
autonomy, it is quite plausible that there might be instances where a certain 
kind of criminal conduct is sufficiently harmful and has proven sufficiently 
resistant to the deterrent effects of punishment that punishment can be said 
                                                                                                                          
293 See supra notes 167–68 and accompanying text (stating that efforts by both punitive and 
preventive governments to thwart criminal activity—such as threats of punishment, preventive 
detention, and restraining orders—inhibit an individual’s freedom to engage in a wide range of legal 
activity in addition to preventing criminal conduct). 
294 See supra note 288 and accompanying text (arguing that most scholars agree that preventive 
measures should only be used when punishment fails to prevent crime).  But see Slobogin, supra note 
10, at 122 (arguing for a scheme of prevention to replace the current criminal justice system based on 
punishment). 
295 See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE: LAWS THAT DEPRIVE PEOPLE WITH MENTAL 
DISABILITY OF LIFE AND LIBERTY 134 (2006) (arguing that one who “wants to commit serious crime so 
badly that he is willing to be deprived of liberty or suffer similarly serious consequences” should be 
eligible for preventive detention); Corrado, supra note 288, at 108 (noting the difficulty in 
differentiating between the individual who is not deterred and the one who cannot be deterred); Walen, 
supra note 178, at 904 (suggesting evidentiary difficulties arise when determining whether to detain 
someone on the basis that they might do future harm). 
296 This is not to say that the threat of punishment does not intrude on an actor’s autonomy at all.  
It certainly does, but that intrusion is the smallest intrusion possible for the State to still fulfill its 
obligation to protect its citizenry.  See Morse, supra note 3, at 58 (calling the threat of punishment for a 
violation of the criminal law an “ordinary, ‘base-rate’ infringement” on autonomy). 
297 Note that this argument depends on there being a legitimate autonomy interest in deciding 
whether to break the law.  See supra notes 179–91 and accompanying text (arguing that the state 
intervention threatens the individual’s interests in lawful conduct and that the freedom of thought, 
which prohibits punishment for thoughts alone, also includes the power to decide whether to break the 
law or undertake civil disobedience).  If that interest is not legitimate, then a properly tailored perfect 
preventive measure that makes criminal conduct, and only criminal conduct, practically impossible, 
would be less intrusive on an individual’s legitimate autonomy than punishment. 
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to have failed, thus opening the door to the use of perfect prevention.298  
The question of punishment’s failure in preventing a certain kind of 
criminal conduct will require an assessment of both the seriousness of the 
harm caused by the conduct and the extent to which society has exhausted 
the potential of punishment to deter the conduct.  This Article will not 
attempt herein to identify the threshold at which the requisite harmfulness 
or exhaustion can be met.  Note, however, that the magnitude of the 
pressure to conclude that punishment has failed will depend in large part 
on the political power wielded by those who are injured by the targeted 
criminal conduct.  This pressure will threaten to distort the process by 
which the State decides whether certain perfect preventive measures are 
appropriate.299 
Turning then to the question of preference between prevention and 
perfect prevention, the comparison is somewhat similar to comparing 
apples and oranges.  Though both perfect prevention and prevention 
intrude on an actor’s ability to choose whether to break the law, prevention 
effects an autonomy intrusion that is greater in magnitude but more 
narrowly targeted than that of perfect prevention.  The preventive state 
imposes often-substantial limitations on the liberty of targeted individuals 
to engage in both lawful and unlawful conduct.300  The perfect preventive 
state, on the other hand, limits everyone’s autonomy to a lesser degree by 
seeking to prevent only criminal conduct. 
Which, then, is more intrusive on liberty and therefore less desirable?  
One way to answer this question is to begin with the reasonable 
assumption that the State may properly prevent actual criminal conduct and 
then to assess to what extent prevention and perfect prevention each 
intrudes unnecessarily on individual autonomy in pursuit of that goal.  
With respect to prevention, this means inquiring into the accuracy of the 
State’s assessment of an individual’s likelihood of offending, i.e., the risk 
of false determinations of dangerousness, however that is defined,301 and 
the extent to which the preventive measure in question restricts lawful 
                                                                                                                          
298 For instance, more than ten thousand people die annually in motor vehicle accidents involving 
drunk drivers.  NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 2009 DATA: 
ALCOHOL-IMPAIRED DRIVING 1 (2010), available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811385.pdf.  
Despite extensive and costly efforts to deter drunk driving through traditional means, the rate of drunk-
driving-related fatalities has remained constant for several years.  See Rich, supra note 46, at 829 
(describing a decline in the effectiveness of efforts to reduce drunk driving in the 1990s).  Thus, the 
argument could be made that with respect to preventing drunk driving, the punitive state has failed. 
299 See generally Cohen, supra note 44 (discussing strategies, including the anti-circumvention 
provisions of the DMCA, pushed by “major copyright industries” to prevent online copyright 
infringement and protect their business interests). 
300 See supra note 168 and accompanying text (arguing that broad preventive measures reduce the 
freedom to engage in lawful conduct). 
301 See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 4, at 1450 (criticizing the use of prior record as a predictive 
factor for dangerousness). 
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conduct.  With respect to perfect prevention, the inquiry should focus on 
how widespread the targeted criminal conduct is, and thus how much the 
perfect preventive technology also prevents non-criminal conduct because 
some people will never seek to engage in criminal conduct yet will still 
suffer an intrusion on their liberty.302  This analysis is somewhat more fine-
grained than that of the libertarian absolutist, but it still requires resolution 
of difficult normative questions.  For instance, how many people who 
never would have engaged in the targeted criminal conduct must be subject 
to perfect prevention to outweigh the mistaken preventive detention of one 
person who would not have committed the targeted crime?  I will leave 
such questions for another day.  Nonetheless, they teach that whether 
prevention or perfect prevention is preferable must be determined on a 
case-by-case basis. 
V.  CONCLUSION AND AREAS FOR FUTURE INQUIRY 
Perfect prevention—the State’s use of technology to make certain 
criminal conduct practically impossible—is a new paradigm for crime 
prevention that creates opportunities for the State to cure social ills that 
have been resistant to traditional punishment and targeted prevention.  At 
the same time, perfect prevention poses new threats to individual liberties 
and to the relationship between the State and its citizens, as proper 
limitations on the perfect preventive state have not been adequately 
developed.  This Article raises some of these concerns herein and has 
proposed responsive limits to the substantive scope and application of 
perfect prevention.   
The perfect preventive state demands that we explicitly recognize an 
individual’s legitimate interest in being allowed to decide whether to break 
the law.  Recognition of this interest suggests three limits on the perfect 
preventive state: (1) the State cannot interfere directly with an individual’s 
decision whether to break the law; (2) the State should not condition one’s 
freedom to engage in otherwise lawful conduct on her future intent to 
engage in criminal conduct; and (3) the State should be transparent in its 
use of perfect preventive technology, clarifying its role in the 
                                                                                                                          
302 For a discussion of the latter issue, see Rich, supra note 46, at 820–21.  I thank Professor 
Jonathan Zittrain for the observation that this analysis is analogous to that required by the existence of 
the “substantial noninfringing use” safe harbor in the copyright infringement context.  See Sony Corp. 
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) (discussing the balance between 
effective protection for the copyright holder and fair use by consumers).  Unfortunately, the substantial 
non-infringing use standard provides little clear guidance on how to balance “non-infringing” or 
noncriminal conduct against infringing or criminal conduct.  See Shane Nix, Lifting the Supreme 
Court’s Thumb Off of the Scale: Promoting Technological and Entrepreneurial Innovation, While 
Protecting the Interests of Copyright Holders After MGM v. Grokster, 16 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. 
L. 49, 88 (2005) (“[I]t is unclear as to what evidentiary standards are required to find inducement under 
Grokster and ‘substantial non-infringing use’ for contributory infringement under Sony.”). 
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implementation of that technology and articulating the conduct it seeks to 
prevent. 
By imposing a blanket restriction on all people, perfect prevention can 
interfere with valuable interactions between the State and its citizens and 
hamper the “play of everyday practice.”303  These concerns underscore the 
need for transparency in perfect prevention, counsel in favor of perfect 
preventive technologies that leave open the room for “play,” and place 
increased importance on legislative decisions to criminalize conduct.  
Finally, because punishment best respects individual autonomy, it should 
be the preferred means of crime prevention vis-à-vis perfect prevention.  
Nonetheless, there may be situations where punishment fails to prevent 
enough instances of particularly harmful conduct and where the use of 
other means of crime prevention might be justified.  The proper hierarchy 
of perfect prevention and prevention is less clear-cut, however, and which 
approach is preferable will require a case-by-case assessment. 
Numerous issues regarding the use of perfect prevention remain 
outstanding.  First, what sort of procedural limitations should be placed on 
the perfect preventive state?  Because perfect prevention applies to 
everyone, the normal due process paradigm, which requires individualized 
finding before the State can deprive a person of a cognizable liberty or 
property interest, does not cleanly apply.  What sort of findings, then, 
should we require before we allow the State to impose perfect preventive 
technologies?  Also, what sort of requirements should we impose on 
perfect preventive technology to ensure that it targets criminal conduct, 
and only criminal conduct, as accurately as possible?  And once perfect 
prevention technology is in place, what sort of review process should be 
required to guarantee that we do not become wedded to archaic and 
malfunctioning technology?304 
Second, how are political pressures likely to influence the potential 
adoption of perfect preventive measures?  What constituencies have an 
interest in the development of the perfect preventive state?  How should 
the process of assessing potential perfect preventive measures account for 
these political pressures? 
Third, under what circumstances should perfect prevention be 
preferred over punishment?  How much value do we place on the 
autonomy that is lost when one is prevented from engaging in criminal 
conduct?  This Article argues that there is no legitimate autonomy interest 
in committing crime, but that we do have an interest in deciding to break 
the law.  If that is so, how valuable is that autonomy interest?  Is it proper 
                                                                                                                          
303 See COHEN, supra note 51, at 50–57. 
304 See ZITTRAIN, supra note 1, at 114–17 (describing the pitfalls of using technology to apply 
legal standards); Wagner, supra note 51, at 462–63 (arguing that an enforcement scheme reliant on 
technology will lack flexibility and stability). 
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to weigh that interest against the social harm of certain criminal conduct? 
Fourth, is there some hybrid between prevention and perfect 
prevention that is superior to both?  In other words, is the best approach 
one in which we identify those individuals most likely to engage in certain 
criminal conduct and use technology to make it practically impossible for 
them to do so?305  Or do issues about fairness and accuracy make such a 
paradigm impracticable? 
Fifth, at what point, if any, should the concerns raised by perfect 
prevention give way to the societal interest in crime prevention?  Are there 
categories of crimes—like terrorism or sexual assault or computer 
crimes—that are so severe that individual autonomy should be set aside in 
favor of protecting the public?  If so, how do we impose limits on those 
categories to prevent continuing encroachment by perfect prevention in the 
name of public safety and crime prevention? 
  
                                                                                                                          
305 See, e.g., Alexander & Ferzan, supra note 61, at 667 (recognizing the potential of technology 
to prevent crime by imposing minimally-intrusive restrictions on the liberty of responsible but 
dangerous individuals). 
